

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

RESERVE OFFICERS

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SYLLABUS/STUDY GUIDE

FOR

RESERVE OFFICERS'

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS

COURSE

2003

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FOREWORD

**T**his syllabus/study guide describes the Naval War College Reserve Officers' Joint Military Operations Course. It provides detailed session-by-session assignments and study guide material for daily class preparation, as well as administrative information.

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**JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT  
RESERVE OFFICERS' JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS COURSE 2003**

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## **COURSE DESCRIPTION**

### **1. Focus and Objectives.**

The Reserve Officers' Joint Military Operations Course is an intensive series of readings, lectures, and seminars that culminate in a table-top wargame designed for the application of concepts and principles discussed in detail during classroom sessions. The central objective of this course is to improve the students' ability to plan the employment of U.S. military forces in joint and combined operational environments ranging from peacetime presence to conventional war. To this end, students study the process of military operational decision-making and the concepts that must be considered when making those decisions. In addition, they study factors, such as the capabilities and limitations of U.S. and potential opponents' forces. The objective of the course is to prepare military officers to advise senior commanders at the major command level. Detailed objectives include:

- Develop each officer's understanding of national military strategy, supporting theater and maritime strategies, operational art and joint and Service doctrines in the current international environment as they apply to campaigns and operations.
- Improve each officer's understanding of the ways in which international law enables operational commanders in the application of force.
- Develop each officer's ability to select, allocate and task air, land, sea, space and special operations forces for joint and combined operations in peace, crisis and war.
- Improve, via practical demonstration in an exercise, each officer's ability to integrate the knowledge and skills necessary to apply military force across the spectrum of conflict.

### **2. Methodology.**

- a. The course incorporates concepts from history, strategy and operational experience. The pervasive theme is decision-making: the choice of strategies as well as operational decisions. The course emphasizes active learning through seminar discussion.
- b. Capabilities and limitations of forces, as well as the doctrines forces use, are analyzed in a variety of scenarios, from minor engagements to complex battle force and joint and combined force operations. The progression is from the abstract and historical to the particular and current. A single situation may require an understanding of military strategy, international law and operational planning logic, as well as the capabilities and limitations of single Service, joint and multinational forces.
- c. The content, objectives, requirements and assignments for each session are presented in the individual study guide pages of the syllabus.

d. The textbooks and unclassified readings contain all the required material for the course.

### **3. Seminar Group Assignments.**

Each student is assigned to a seminar group. These groups are selected to represent a cross-section of talent and experience. Student seminar, classroom, and faculty moderator assignments will be distributed separately.

### **4. General Schedule of Seminar Meetings and Lectures.**

Seminars will be scheduled Monday through Friday. In general, the mornings are divided into two sessions, from 0830 to 1000 and from 1015 to 1145. The afternoons usually consist of two seminar sessions from 1300 to 1430, and from 1445 to 1615. A weekly schedule will be issued to confirm or modify the course schedule promulgated on pages vii-ix of this syllabus.

### **5. Readings.**

Required readings for the first two days of class are mailed in advance and are to be read by all students prior to arrival at the Naval War College. Required readings will be issued to students. Supplementary readings will not be issued unless they are used in other sessions as required readings.

### **6. Individual Student Responsibilities.**

Students are expected to prepare thoroughly for each scheduled session and to participate actively and positively in classroom discussion and game play. Much of the learning evolves from the process of making operational decisions and from the resolution of differing points of view during development of courses of action. A tough-minded, questioning attitude and a willingness to enter vigorously into discussion are central to the College's learning method.

### **7. Workload.**

In order to provide a worthwhile academic experience in two weeks, the Reserve Officers' Joint Military Operations Course is intensive and very demanding of the students' time and energy. The working days in residence require a full work day in formal classroom activities, plus student preparation in off-duty hours.

### **8. Learning Environment.**

This course is intended to provide you with a professional and useful learning experience. If this objective is not being met, let one of the faculty know. The relationship between students and faculty must be based on mutual respect and a common goal — your professional advancement. We look forward to an exciting and valuable academic experience.

## KEY PERSONNEL

For additional information pertaining to the JMO Reserve Course, you may contact one of the individuals listed below:

Chairman of the Department: .....	CAPT A. J. Ruoti, USN Room C-205, 841-3556
Executive Assistant: .....	PROF J. C. Hodell Room C-203, 841-6458
Course Director .....	CAPT S. D. Kornatz, USN Room C-420, 841-6460
Course Coordinator: .....	Ms. Carol Stewart Room C-203, 841-4120
Faculty Points of Contact .....	Prof. J. R. Ballard Room C-411, 841-6415  CDR J. L. Barker, USN Room C-409, 841-6484  Lt Col J. E. Brence, USAF Room C-410, 841-6476  CAPT W. J. Richardson, USN Room C-413, 841-6466  CDR B. J. Waltman, USN Room C-424, 841-6473
Reserve Affairs Advisor:.....	CAPT J. F. Daltymple, Jr., USNR 841-3068
Reserve Affairs Assistant: .....	Ms. Ellie Silveria Room C-139N, 841-1325

RESERVE OFFICERS' JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS COURSE 2003  
SCHEDULE OF SEMINARS AND LECTURES  
(8-19 SEPTEMBER 2003)

**WEEK ONE**

**MONDAY, 8 SEPTEMBER  
(UNIFORM DAY)**

0730-0810		Check-In (Start at Quarterdeck in Conolly Hall)
0815-0830		President, NWC "Welcome Aboard" (McCarty-Little Hall Auditorium)
0830-0850		Class Photo
0900-0930		Reserve Affairs Administrative Remarks — CAPT J. F. Daltymple, Jr., USNR
0930-1000		Course Overview — CAPT A. J. Ruoti, JMO Chairman
1015-1045	OPS-1	Seminar Introductions (Seminar rooms)
1100-1200		Lunch (shift to civilian informal—optional)
1200-1330	OPS-2	National Military Strategy/Strategic Objective (Seminar)
1345-1445	OPS-3	The Interagency Process (Lecture)
1500-1630	OPS-4	Operational Art Concepts I (Seminar)
1700-1900		Icebreaker (Officer's Club — <i>suitable casual attire</i> )

**TUESDAY, 9 SEPTEMBER**

0830-1000	OPS-5	Operational Art Concepts II (Seminar)
1015-1145	OPS-6	Operational Art Concepts III (Seminar)
1145-1300		Lunch
1300-1430	OPS-7	Operational Art Concepts IV (Seminar)
1445-1615	OPS-8	National Military Organization (Seminar)

**WEDNESDAY, 10 SEPTEMBER**

0830-0945	OPS-9	Operational Logistics (Seminar)
1000-1130	OPS-10	Strategic Mobility (Seminar)
1130-1300		Lunch
1300-1615	OPS-11	Service Capabilities and Doctrine (Seminar)

**THURSDAY, 11 SEPTEMBER**

0830-1000	OPS-12	Operational Command and Control (Seminar)
1015-1145	OPS-13	Intelligence/C4ISR (Lecture)
1145-1300		Lunch
1245-1300		JPME and Continuing Education Brief (optional) MLH Auditorium
1300-1615	OPS-14	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) (Seminar)

### **FRIDAY, 12 SEPTEMBER**

0830-1000	OPS-15	Operational Law and Factor Space (Seminar)
1015-1145	OPS-16	Law of Armed Conflict (Seminar)
1145-1315		Lunch
1200-1310		Brown Bag Lunchtime Lecture of Opportunity on KOSOVO (Optional - Room TBA)
1315-1445	OPS-17	Rules of Engagement (Seminar)
1500-1600	OPS-18	Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) (Seminar)

### **WEEK TWO**

### **MONDAY, 15 SEPTEMBER**

0830-0945	OPS-19	Homeland Security (Seminar)
1000-1145	OPS-20	Peace Operations (Seminar)
1145-1300		Lunch
1300-1615	OPS-21	Introduction to the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) (Seminar)

### **TUESDAY, 16 SEPTEMBER**

0830-1145	OPS-21	The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) (Seminar)
1145-1300		Lunch
1300-1615	OPS-21	The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) (Seminar)

### **WEDNESDAY, 17 SEPTEMBER**

0830-1145	OPS-21	The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) (Seminar)
1145-1300		Lunch
1300-1615	OPS-21	The Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) (Seminar)

### **THURSDAY, 18 SEPTEMBER**

0830-1145	OPS-22	Joint Task Force War Game (JTFWG) (Seminar)
1145-1300		Working Lunch
1300-1615	OPS-22	Joint Task Force War Game (JTFWG) (Seminar)
1800-2130		Class Dinner (Officer's Club)

### **FRIDAY, 19 SEPTEMBER**

0830-1000	OPS-22	Joint Task Force War Game (JTFWG) (Seminar)
1015-1100	OPS-22	Joint Task Force War Game Hot Wash-up and Course Critique (Seminar)
1115-1130		President, NWC Farewell Remarks
1130-1200		Check-Out



## COURSE INTRODUCTION

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### A. Focus:

This session consists of a welcome aboard and course overview by the Joint Military Operations Department Chairman, CAPT Tony Ruoti, USN, followed by a seminar session during which the seminar moderators and students introduce themselves and address course specifics.

### B. Objectives:

- To gain an understanding of the overall course objectives.
- To gain insight into the concepts and principles that are integral to achieving your fullest military potential.
- To identify the backgrounds of faculty and student members of each seminar.

### C. Background:

Each student brings unique experiences to the classroom. The learning that takes place in seminar is the result of sharing each other's ideas as they relate to the material being studied. Further analysis, based on the new concepts that will be introduced, should focus on considerations regarding the application of force in the joint and combined environment. Rereading the Course Description will help to confirm the overall course objectives.

### D. Required Readings:

U.S. Naval War College. *Reserve Officers' Joint Military Operations Syllabus 2003*. Read Course Description. Scan remainder.

Joint Pub 1. *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 14 November 2000. [scan].

*Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer*, 10 September 2001. [scan].

## NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY/STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE (Seminar)

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### A. Focus:

This session will focus on the *strategic objective* and how it must drive military thinking and actions throughout the entire range of military operations. We will discuss the direct relationship between national strategic objectives and operational objectives and the concept of “regressive planning” to maintain focus on the goal. We will look at the interrelationship between the four elements of national power (diplomatic, military, economic, and informational) and how the *strategic objective* relates to the *Desired End State* (the strategic vision of how things should look at the conclusion of the operation). Our discussion will include a brief look at the policy documents which provide strategic direction to the military, such as the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Military Strategy*.

### B. Objectives:

- Comprehend how the elements of the *National Security Strategy* and *National Military Strategy* relate to the operational level of war.
- Introduce the concept of regressive planning, which is key to grasping the perspective and operational-level planning that is the focus of the course.
- Introduce the “Five Questions” and analyze how they can help the operational commander apply assets in the pursuit of strategic objectives.
- Examine the interrelationship among the four elements of national power (diplomatic, military, economic, and informational) and how the *strategic objective* relates to the *Desired End State*.

### C. Background:

The *National Military Strategy* (NMS) establishes key principles for the employment of U.S. military forces across the spectrum of conflict. Its purpose is to implement the agenda of the President’s *National Security Strategy* (NSS). The most recent versions of these two documents reflect core national goals long pursued by the United States, yet also reflect a continued movement toward more regional approaches. In particular, this construct envisions the regional combatant commanders “shaping” the situation in order to minimize the chances for conflict while maximizing U.S. advantages should conflict occur.

In response to a developing crisis, commanders at all levels must assess the strategic goal (in keeping with the NMS and NSS) in terms of five questions:

1. What **military** (or related political and social) **conditions** must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
2. What **sequence of actions** is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)

3. How should the **resources** of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)
4. What is the likely **cost or risk** to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?
5. What resources must be committed or actions performed to successfully execute the JFC's exit strategy?

The operational commander must ensure his response to the "five questions" (the essence of his plan) remains in line with strategic guidance. While some situations allow for clear military answers to these questions, in other cases there may be no "military condition" which will contribute to the stated or implied strategic objective. Often, the appropriate action may be diplomatic or economic, with the military in a supporting role. When military conflict appears necessary, the operational commander must also anticipate and plan for war termination and post-conflict activities (which will include both military and civilian elements). Without considering these aspects from the outset of planning, there is little chance that even the best planned military operation can achieve the Desired End State.

The point of contact for this session is PROF John R. Ballard, C-411.

#### **D. Questions:**

How does the NMS help operational commanders translate strategy into operational plans?

How can the "Five Questions" help an operational commander respond to strategic guidance?

What is the connection between planning for conflict and planning for post-conflict operations? Why does it matter when you do this planning?

Who determines the term and conditions for conflict termination?

#### **E. Required Readings:**

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 September 2001, pp. I-1 to I-12, III-1 to III-4.

JMO, "Putting First Things First," Newport, 1999. (**NWC 3012**).

National Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, 1997. [Scan]

*The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002.

"U.S. Military Debates Link Between Kosovo Air War, State Objectives," *Inside Washington*, 20 April 2000, (**NWC 3043**).

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## THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS (Lecture)

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*Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the U.S. Government (USG) as well as nongovernmental agencies. The intrinsic nature of interagency coordination demands that commanders and joint planners consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective. Success in operations will depend, to a large extent, on the ability to blend and engage all elements of national power effectively.*

Joint Pub 3-08

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### A. Focus:

Modern military operations require the proper application of all elements of national power, yet commanders frequently state that interagency coordination is one of their biggest challenges. With this thought in mind, students must understand the key principles associated with the interagency process (both in Washington and abroad) in order to enhance the prospects for success during joint operations. This session will address: joint doctrine for interagency coordination, Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), the basic roles and authorities vested in a U.S. Ambassador and country team, and the concepts associated with Security Assistance.

### B. Objectives:

- Understand the impact of interagency coordination on strategic, operational and tactical military activities.
- Comprehend the interagency coordination process and the impact of Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56).
- Understand the role of the U.S. Ambassador and the organization and functions of a country team in U.S. embassies abroad as they may impact on military planning.
- Comprehend current joint doctrine with respect to the interagency coordination process as described in Joint Pub 3-08, Volumes I and II.

### C. Background:

Military commanders need to understand how military advice is formulated at the strategic level through the Washington interagency process and how government agencies contribute to the successful prosecution of the modern joint campaign. Key to success at the operational level is the relationship among affected U.S. Ambassadors, the theater commander and their staffs. Modern operations also require a practical understanding of methods for developing unity of effort among the large number of supra-national organizations (the United Nations and regional bodies, such as the Organization of American States), government agencies and even non-governmental agencies (including PVOs) that may be operating within

the battlespace. PDD-56, developed by the Clinton Administration, is still the current policy for developing unity of effort for complex contingency operations. Understanding these relationships will assist the students in coordinating across the full spectrum of military operations.

A key to this session is knowledge of the range of resources available to military commanders and recent lessons learned in developing successful coordination. NGOs (including PVOs) often have links with local populations unreachable in any other way. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) acts as the lead federal agency for foreign disaster assistance. There are many circumstances when the Department of State, in the person of the in-country ambassador (the President's direct representative), is the lead agency for dealing with a situation. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) can provide a range of information relevant to both military and political success, either via the in-country Chief of Station, via the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) representative to the CINC, or (along with other members of the intelligence community) as part of a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).

Apart from civilian resources, the military commander has military assets particularly well suited to accomplishing MOOTW tasks. For example, civil affairs units and SOF are useful both in their "traditional" roles and as liaison officers between the military and external agencies or other military forces. In the latter case, liaison officers have been effective in establishing and maintaining unity of effort in a multilateral environment. The civil-military operations center (CMOC) is a proven method of improving coordination during operations.

Security Assistance (SA) applies across the conflict continuum. SA programs often attempt to address the root-causes of the problems facing a nation by helping in the development of host nation internal defense and development plans. Although SA is the responsibility of the State Department, DoD is the executive agent for a number of SA programs. DoD executes its SA mission through an array of organizations operating in CONUS. Within a host nation, the responsibilities of SA are carried out by organizations within the local U.S. mission which go by a variety of titles, such as, Military Assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and Military Groups (MilGps). At the Unified Command level, the CINCs provide the means for SA organizations to render that support and provide regional coordination.

The point of contact for this session is PROF John R. Ballard, C-411.

#### **D. Questions:**

What do we mean by "interagency coordination" and why is it important?

Describe the characteristics of the interagency working environment, per National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1).

What is PDD-56? What role does it play in the interagency management of complex contingency operations?

How does the interagency process function in Washington? What do we mean by the term “lead agency”?

How does the NSC system work? What are the roles played by National Security Council and the Presidential Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs)?

What is the responsibility of the U.S. Ambassador in terms of interagency coordination?

Why might the operational commander be concerned with the interagency process and non-DoD resources?

Provide examples of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), and regional and international organizations that may play roles within the modern battlespace.

How may we best organize for success for interagency operations at the operational level?

What are some organizational tools JTFs may employ to enhance prospects for success in interagency operations?

#### **E. Required Readings:**

Organization of the National Security Council System (**NWC 3089**).

Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Cooperation during Joint Operations, Vol. I, Chapters I-III.

Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Cooperation during Joint Operations*, Vol. II. [Scan].

PDD-56, National Security Council White Paper on Managing Complex Contingency Operations. (**NWC 3072**).



## OPERATIONAL ART CONCEPTS I (Seminar)

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*If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and preparation.*

Napoléon Bonaparte

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### A. Focus:

During the four sessions on Operational Art Concepts, DESERT STORM will be used as the historical illustration for the concepts discussed. “Extracts from Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,” (NWC 1088) will provide the basis for these discussions.

This session will focus on understanding the concept of **Operational Art**; the linkage between **Operational Art** and **Strategy** and **Tactics**; and the concept of **Theaters** and how they relate to the levels of war.

### B. Objectives:

- Understand the concept of *Operational Art*.
- Understand the relationship among *Operational Art*, *Strategy*, and *Tactics*.
- Know relevant definitions and basic concepts involved in studying *Operational Art*.
- Understand the distinctions and relationships among the *Strategic*, *Operational*, and *Tactical* Levels of War.
- Comprehend the differences among *Campaigns*, *Major Operations*, and *Tactical Actions*, and how these relate to the *Levels of War*.
- Understand how peacetime and wartime *Theaters* are designed, including the key elements of a maritime theater.

### C. Background:

#### *Operational Art*

In modern warfare, a sound and coherent strategy alone is insufficient to ensure a decisive victory. Neither is a combat force, well trained in tactics, sufficient in itself to ensure success. Since military forces and the battlespace involved have grown exponentially since the nineteenth century, an intermediate level of theoretical study, planning and practice emerged, of necessity, to link strategy and tactics — **Operational Art**.

Decisive theater-level warfare is achieved by application of sound operational concepts. Effective execution of *Operational Art* can permit a highly capable,

well-trained and skillfully-led force, guided by a sound strategy, to defeat a stronger opponent.

The American Civil War (1861-65) was perhaps the first conflict in which rudimentary “theater” or “operational” warfare was conducted. In the Wars of German Unification (1866-71) there were several armies in the field, and in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, the first “front” or “army group” commands were employed.

The lessons of World War I, combined with new technological advances in weaponry, led to the development of innovative operational concepts in the interwar years, perhaps the most notable being the German *Blitzkrieg*. In addition, the theoretical foundations of *Operational Art* at sea and in the air were laid down during the 1920s and '30s.

World War II witnessed the practical application of *Operational Art* by all Services on a grand scale. Every belligerent conducted numerous major operations and integrated campaigns in all theaters of war.

In the aftermath of World War II, interest in the theoretical study and practical application of *Operational Art* steadily declined in the West. The Korean War of 1950-53 can be considered the last conflict until the late 1980s in which U.S. armed forces applied the tenets of *Operational Art* and operational thinking.

The decline in operational thinking in the U.S. and the West was due to several factors. Probably the most important was the belief that, because of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, there would be no need for large conventional operations. Also, the fixation on counter-insurgency warfare led many Western theoreticians and practitioners to believe that the day of major military operations and campaigns was past. The Soviets, by contrast, continued to pay attention to the theoretical study of *Operational Art* and the development of operational concepts in the postwar years.

A renewal of interest in *Operational Art* in the West began in the late 1970s. The U.S. Army took the early lead, and remains the principal champion of *Operational Art* among the U.S. Services. Moreover, the Army's influence is clearly visible in U.S. joint doctrinal documents.

*Operational Art* has thus emerged as one of the three components of military art, sometimes also called the “art of war,” along with *Strategy* and *Tactics*. These components of military art are inextricably linked. *Operational Art* is applied across the entire range of military operations, that is, from “military operations other than war” (MOOTW) to war itself. In that regard, as military planners and warfighters, we would do well to remember that theory should always be in harmony with operational realities, such as national will and cohesion, and weapon systems and personnel limitations. Otherwise, as battlefield outcomes have frequently instructed us, operational concepts, no matter how well conceived, will almost certainly fail in practice. History has clearly demonstrated that a fixation on technology at the expense of operational thinking can preclude success against an



opponent who, though perhaps not having the most advanced equipment, thinks more perceptively, and acts faster, with greater determination.

### *Joint Application of Operational Art and Doctrine*

Each military Service operates in a different operational context, employing ground, air, or naval forces and tactical doctrine optimized for these situations. However, because the forces of each Service perform most effectively in synergy with those of the other Services, our study of *Operational Art* will focus on a *joint* operations perspective. As a departure point, Joint Publication 3-0 is the keystone document of the joint operations series of doctrine. It provides fundamental principles and doctrine that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in the conduct of joint and multinational operations.

Chapter III of Joint Publication 3-0 outlines the various facets of *Operational Art* which are applied to planning and executing joint military operations. The goal of joint operations is to achieve national objectives on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies or coalition partners, and to establish post-hostilities conditions that will continue to support those objectives.

A key point to remember as we begin the analysis of operational art and its components is that its broad parameters are drawn from the history of combat experience and the hard lessons learned therein. Those fundamentals will likely remain valid and vital to future joint military planning and operations as more revolutionary weapons and command and control systems emerge.

### *Levels of War*

To begin the journey toward understanding the fundamentals of *Operational Art*, we should first recognize the *Levels of War*, and begin to understand how these influence the development of related national and military plans.

There is general agreement that there are three basic *Levels of Warfare*: *Strategic*, *Operational*, and *Tactical*. The *Strategic Level* can be further divided into two sub-levels: *National-Strategic* and *Theater-Strategic*. Moreover, at the *Operational Level*, some theorists also identify sub-levels: *Operational-Strategic* and *Operational-Tactical*. The levels of war cannot always be neatly delineated because the operations therein are heavily interrelated, precise distinctions are blurred by time and circumstances, and individual and Service perspectives regarding the sub-levels of war are not always in agreement. Moreover, events occurring at the lower levels of conflict often have direct consequences at higher levels, with the reverse also being true. All of which further complicates the definitional problem. In any event, it is clear that planning and force employment must be related to the proper level of operations for the command authority and responsibilities concerned or dangerous confusion frequently ensues.

Traditionally, each level of war correlates with a general command echelon. Modern, high speed, electronically integrated warfare may modify this practice. To maximize combat effectiveness and eliminate redundancy, future levels of

command may match objectives sought to the size of the physical environment in which the commander's forces can effectively operate and the extent of that specific echelon's ability to influence events and command and control forces. Thus, the levels of war may be compressed or significantly modified.

### *Theater Structure*

Once the objectives of major operations and campaigns have been defined, the physical areas of operations and responsibility must be delineated in order that the various echelons of command may be tied to the specific objectives to be achieved at each echelon. One of the products of this analytical process is the classic military *Theater of Operations* and its sub-divisions.

Joint Publication 1-02 defines a *Theater of War* as "that area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of war." A *Theater of War* does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire peacetime *Area of Responsibility (AOR)*, but could straddle the boundary between two geographic *AORs*. In a global conflict, several theaters of war may exist simultaneously, differentiated by geography, priority, or existing command and control infrastructure. Geographic combatant commanders may further define one or more *Theaters of Operations* within the *Theater of War*, each with its own designated commander and strategic objectives.

Joint Publication 3-0 outlines the structure of *Theaters* and *Operational Areas*, depending primarily upon the scope of the joint action and the objectives to be achieved. For operations that are limited in scope or duration, a Joint Force Commander (JFC) may establish *Joint Operations Areas*, *Joint Special Operations Areas*, or other smaller areas of operations as part of a theater of operations or as stand-alone areas. We will discuss the distinctions among and applications of these operational areas during this seminar session.

### *Categories of Combat Force Employment*

Categories of modern methods of combat force employment have resulted from the evolution of warfare over essentially the last two centuries. These elements of warfare are currently categorized in joint doctrine as *Campaigns*, *Major Operations*, and *Tactical Actions*. The definitions and characteristics of each, and their interrelationships will be examined in this session.

The point of contact for this session is PROF Theodore L. Gatchel, C-413.

## **D. Questions:**

Are *Operational Art* and the *Operational Level of War* the same thing? If not, how are they distinguished?

Provide examples of how a geographic combatant commander (CINC) might serve as either a *strategic* level commander or an *operational* level commander. Was General Schwarzkopf a strategic or operational level commander during Operation Desert Storm?

Summarize the meaning of “*Theater*” in U.S. terms. When is a *Theater of Operations* established? Explain the meaning of the term “*Area of Operations*.” Describe the difference between “*Theater of War*” and “*Theater of Operations*” with regard to objective and command relationships.

The U.S. Navy defines the term naval “operation” as: “a naval action or the performance of naval missions that may be strategic, tactical, logistical, or training. It is also the process of carrying on or training for naval combat to gain the objective of any battle or campaign.” Compare the Navy’s definition of an “operation” with what is defined in joint doctrine as a *Major Operation*.

#### **E. Required Readings:**

U.S. Department of Defense, “Extracts from Conduct of the Persian Gulf War.” (NWC 1088). This reading will be used in all four Operational Concepts sessions.

Schneider, James J., “The Loose Marble — and the Origins of Operational Art.” (NWC 4004).

Joint Publication 3-0. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Preface, Executive Summary, II-2 to II-3, and II-19 to II-22.

JMO Department, “Methods of Combat Force Employment.” (NWC 4099A).

Vego, Milan, *Operational Warfare*; Parts I, III, and VI, [scan, use for reference].

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## OPERATIONAL ART CONCEPTS II (Seminar)

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### A. Focus:

In this session, we'll use the concepts we explored in OPS-4 as a departure point for delineating another set of **Operational Art Concepts** which both further define Operational Art and also provide us with analytical tools for evaluating historical examples of the Art and planning for future operations. Much of the essence of Operational Art involves the process of deploying the right forces in the right place at the right time, with a clear mission that optimizes their effect upon the adversary. This process includes the study and application of the **Operational Factors of Space, Time, and Forces**, particularly with regard to their relationship to the levels of war and the structuring of a military theater. We will introduce the **Principles of War**—historical guidelines learned on the battlefield that provide broad parameters for the effective exploitation of the Operational Factors. Finally, we'll explore the **Operational Functions** that must be performed effectively in the theater if our assigned forces are to achieve their assigned objectives.

### B. Objectives:

- Illustrate and define the *Operational Factors* of *Space*, *Time*, and *Forces* and describe how these interrelate.
- List the *Principles of War*, discuss their applicability to modern warfare, and explain how the priority or emphasis of one principle over another is situation dependent.
- Describe the *Operational Functions* and discuss how these are vital to the successful employment of forces at the theater-strategic/operational level of warfare.

### C. Background:

#### *Operational Factors*

Particularly at the theater-strategic level, the decisions of the combatant commander concerning the deployment and employment of assigned forces are critical. These decisions, properly executed, are driven largely by consideration of the factors of Time, Space, and Forces. As an example, in 1990-91 Saddam Hussein allowed the CINCCENT, General Schwarzkopf, a six-month period to build up forces and deploy them optimally for the onset of combat. Moreover, Saddam apparently ignored the potential for the Allied Coalition to exploit the Time-Space-Forces interaction and rapidly move over an expanse of desert a large armored force around his flank, severing his Lines of Communication and forcing a panicked retreat from Kuwait. A mistake in judgment by the operational commander regarding Time-Space-Forces interactions before the onset of hostilities can lead to disaster, as evidenced by the German invasion of Russia in

the Second World War. In short, how effectively the operational commander manages the *Operational Factors* — *Time, Space, and Forces* — may well be the crucial element of Operational Art.

*Time* and *Space* have a distinct reciprocal effect upon each other. The less *Time* used by the force on the offensive for mobilization, deployment and employment, the more likely the defender will be unprepared. Correspondingly, any military action takes place in a clearly defined battlespace. For the attacker, the aim is to gain *Space* in the least *Time* possible, while the defender will try to maintain control over *Space* and delay the attacker in reaching his objective. A gain of *Time* is generally to the advantage of the defender, for, as the attacker increases his efforts in response, his combat power declines over *Time*.

Gain or loss of *Space* in and of itself is not inherently a disadvantage or advantage. What matters more is the relation between *Space* and military forces. While *Space* (*geography*) cannot alone determine the success of military effort, the relationship between *Space* and *Forces* can be decisive. Again, the manner in which the vast spaces of the western Soviet Union “swallowed up” the German Army in World War II is instructive.

### *Principles of War*

Historians and military leaders have studied past wars ad infinitum in an effort to discover whether there are underlying principles that would explain the victories of successful commanders and thereby serve as guidance for the conduct of future combat operations. The result has been an emerging general consensus that there is indeed a set of broad general ideas which have guided victorious commanders over time. While there may not be precise agreement as to the specific number and terminology of these principles, it is safe to say that a general outline of the concepts has emerged.

The *Principles of War* are clearly some of the primary parameters that guide warfighting and the development of military doctrine. The *Principles of War* relating to U.S. military doctrine can be found in Appendix A of Joint Publication 3-0. These are: *Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity*.

### *Operational Functions*

The existence of an *Operational Level of War* suggests the concurrent existence of theater-wide *functions* that enable force employment. The effective performance of these *Operational Functions* thus facilitates the ability of operational commanders and their subordinate forces to carry out their missions in both peace and war. In the operational rarity of a *Mature Theater*, operational functions will normally be established in their entirety in peacetime. However, in an *Undeveloped* or *Immature Theater*, these will exist in a rudimentary form, or not at all. The challenge to the operational commander is to effectively plan, prepare and employ his assigned forces within the limitations inherent in a less developed theater, a situation which is usually the norm.

The descriptive terminology for *Operational Functions* is not yet completely standardized. As an example, the Army describes them as “operating systems,” at the tactical level. The *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*, which will be available in each classroom, lists the activities required to establish and maintain these functions at all levels of warfare, but describes them as “tasks.” The terminology may differ in various publications, but the general concept of recurring necessary tasks to be performed at the various levels of war remains.

The Operational Functions, as listed in the *UJTL*, are:

- Operational movement and maneuver
- Operational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- Operational firepower
- Operational logistics and personnel support
- Operational command & control
- Operational force protection

The required readings for this session provide a brief overview of each of the *Functions* and its associated activities. During your reading, you will probably find that you are already familiar with these *Functions* as these apply to the *tactical* level of operations.

The point of contact for this session is PROF Theodore L. Gatchel, C-413.

#### **D. Questions:**

Outline the interrelationships among the factors of:

- Space and Time,
- Space and Forces, and
- Time and Forces.

Define and discuss each of the *Operational Functions* as applied to a *Theater of Operations*. Cite examples from history of successful or failed applications of the *Functions*. Do the *Functions* have applicability in peacetime?

What are, or should not be, the applications of the *Principles of War* in planning and executing military operations?

#### **E. Required Readings:**

Brodie, Bernard, “The Worth of Principles of War”; A lecture to the U.S. Army Command and Staff College; Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; 7 March 1957. (NWC 1057).

Vego, Milan, *Operational Warfare*; Parts II [read] and IV, [scan, use for reference].

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Appendix A, “Principles of War.”  
JMO Department, “Operational Functions.” (**NWC 4103A**).



## OPERATIONAL ART CONCEPTS III (Seminar)

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### A. Focus:

During the initial sessions of this course dealing with **Operational Art** (OPS-4 and 5), we developed a list of concepts which defined Operational Art and provided the following analytical tools for determining sound Operational Art practices in planning for and executing joint force operations, such as:

- **Operational Functions**, which have to be in place to support the effective employment of forces.
- Managing the **Operational Factors** — **Time, Space, and Forces** — in order to ensure a successful battlespace outcome.
- Defining the **Principles of War** and their applicability to joint force planning and combat execution.

We now turn to elements of Operational Art that deal more specifically with transforming concepts into operational plans, specifically, determining enemy/friendly **Critical Factors, Centers of Gravity**, and the **Operational Design** elements of force employment plans.

### B. Objectives:

- Define and describe a potential enemy's *Critical Factors*.
- Define *Center of Gravity* in terms of *Operational Art*.
- Describe the principal elements of *Operational Design*.
- Understand the *Operational Idea/Scheme*, and discuss its relationship to *Operational Design*.

### C. Background:

#### *Critical Factors*

One of the first steps in the planning phase of a military action *is to identify* the enemy's *Critical Factors* (principal strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities). *Critical Strengths* include those enemy capabilities considered as *vital* for the achievement of the enemy's assumed objectives. The most important among these strengths is the "*Center of Gravity*" (*COG*), which Joint Pub 1-02 defines as "Those characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." Carl von Clausewitz' concept of *Center of Gravity* might be summarized as "A source of 'massed' strength—physical or moral, or sometimes a source of leverage—whose neutralization, serious degradation, disclosure, or destruction will have the most decisive impact on one's own ability to accomplish given offensive or defensive objectives" (**NWC 4096A**). *COG's* can be "abstract" (e.g., national will, alliance cohesion, etc.) or "concrete" (e.g., forces and assets). New *COGs* may emerge or



existing *Centers* evolve during the conduct of a major operation; hence, the battlespace situation must be continually evaluated by the commander and his staff. *Critical weaknesses* include those essential capabilities that are *inadequate to perform their intended function* or task. Those *critical weaknesses*, and in some cases, *critical strengths*, vulnerable to one's physical attack or other actions become *critical vulnerabilities*—open to enemy exploitation and may offer an indirect avenue for defeating a *center of gravity* (COG).

### *Operational Design*

A *Major Operation* or *Campaign* contains a number of functional activities that collectively ensure the achievement of assigned objective(s). It follows that the operational commander must use an overall *Operational Design* to create the plans which will rationalize these functions and ensure that assigned forces are employed in a coherent manner, focused on the operational and strategic goals for the theater.

The principal elements of *Operational Design* are: *Guidance*, *Objective*, *Desired End State*, *Enemy Critical Factors*, *Direction/Axis of Attack*, and *Operational Idea* (or Scheme).

*Guidance* refers to the direction and focus provided to the commander by his superiors and the related broad directions subsequently provided by the commander to his subordinates. The *Objectives* are defined by senior authorities and subsequently by the commander to his component forces. *Desired End State*, introduced in OPS-2, refers to the desired “state of the theater” after the cessation of hostilities, and may take years to achieve. Operational commanders have frequently failed to adequately consider *Desired End State* when planning and conducting military operations. The *Operational Idea* or *Scheme* is an overview of the major planning elements that define how the commander intends to conduct contemplated operations. In this sense, the overview will contain the broad vision of what the commander intends to do and how he intends to do it. The commander's scheme should address the basic operational planning questions of *who*, *what*, *where*, *when*, *why*, and *how* with regard to forces employed. Perhaps most importantly, the *Operational Idea* should clearly focus on the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's *Center(s) of Gravity*.

*Operational Sequencing* involves the arrangement of **events** aimed to create overwhelming combat power in the order most likely to accomplish a given objective. Normally, these events are arranged by deducing a series of *tasks* to be carried out simultaneously and/or sequentially to achieve assigned operational and strategic goals.

*Synchronization* is the coordination of **actions** by diverse combat arms and/or Service forces with regard to *objective*, *place*, and *time*, aimed to generate maximum relative combat power at a *Decisive Point*. Effective *Synchronization* ensures that all elements of the integrated forces generate the effect that exceeds the sum of their individual capabilities. Clarity of the *Commander's Intent* is a critical factor in

ensuring synchronization of efforts, especially in the employment of multi-service or multi-national forces.

The point of contact for this session is PROF Theodore L. Gatchel, C-413.

#### **D. Questions:**

Describe the relationships among Critical Strengths, Critical Weaknesses, Critical Vulnerabilities, and Center(s) of Gravity. Can a Critical Weakness be a *COG* that is vulnerable to attack?

Some analysts have criticized the CINCCENT, General Schwarzkopf, for retaining both the role of *Theater CINC* and *Land Forces Component Commander* during Operation Desert Storm. In this case, did he violate his own *Operational Scheme* for the *Campaign*? How about the *Principles of War*? Did the CINC err in that regard? Do the results justify his decision? What would you have done in his situation?

How do the elements of *Operational Design* apply to the planning of a *Major Operation* or *Campaign*?

How might enemy *centers of gravity* be attacked and friendly *centers of gravity* protected?

What is *Strategic (operational) Guidance*, and why is it important?

How does *Desired End State* differ from *Objective*?

#### **E. Required Readings:**

Izzo, Lawrence L., "The Center of Gravity is not an Achilles Heel." (NWC 1026).

JMO Department, "Elements of Operational Warfare." (NWC 4096A).

Vego, Milan, *Operational Warfare*: Part V, pp. 307-318, "Critical Factors and Center of Gravity"; pp. 433-468, "Campaign Design"; pp. 469-494, "Major Operation Design"; pp. 531-543, "Operational Sequencing"; and pp. 545-588, "Operational Synchronization."

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## OPERATIONAL ART CONCEPTS IV (Seminar)

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### A. Focus:

This seminar session continues the study of **Operational Art** concepts with emphasis upon the **linkage** between **Service** and **Joint Doctrine**.

### B. Objectives:

- Understand the development of *Operational Art* in the United States.
- Understand the *Joint Doctrine development process* and how the fundamentals and principles of *Joint Doctrine* are formulated.
- Comprehend the relationship between *Service Doctrine* and *Joint Doctrine*.
- Comprehend and cite examples of the *Factors* influencing *Joint Doctrine*.
- Comprehend current *Joint Doctrine* as it applies to *Operational Art*.

### C. Background:

#### *Operational Art*

*Operational Art* provides the analytical, planning and implementation framework necessary to successfully link *National Strategy*, *Theater Military Operations*, and battlespace *Tactics*.

The American study and practice of *Operational Art*, at least in rudimentary form, began after the war of 1812 when military thinkers began to realize that warfare was undergoing fundamental changes. During the period between the 20th Century's two world wars, *Operational Art* (labeled as "strategy," and influenced chiefly by the operational concepts of Clausewitz) permeated the conceptual innovations of this extraordinarily productive period. The success of joint and combined *Campaigns* in World War II reflected a sophisticated understanding of *Operational Art* in planning and execution. The war's immediate aftermath saw a major revision of the military's doctrinal publications; these new editions were enriched with a deft blend of superb, operational level thinking and the practical wisdom of experienced campaigners.

Then such thinking receded, this time for nearly three decades, until the Vietnam experience compelled a reassessment. Led by William DePuy, Donn Starry, and others in the U.S. Army, *Operational Art* reemerged. This time the term, *Operational Art*, entered the American lexicon, and in 1982 Army doctrine clearly identified it. During subsequent years, this operational thinking has expanded throughout the U.S. military's training and educational institutions. Today's military publications library reflects the significant and growing influence of *Operational Art* concepts.

## *Doctrine*

One of the most significant derivatives of the analytical element of *Operational Art* has been modern military *Doctrine*. In this sense, *Doctrine* is the product of literally centuries of study of successful and failed *Battles, Operations, and Campaigns*. This analysis of the hard lessons of combat has produced a series of guiding concepts which relate to the differing environments in which each of the military Services operates and the historically demonstrated “successful” employment of their weapon systems and personnel. As such, the doctrine of each Service is rich in history, tradition, and not a little propaganda. The latter point is of course related to future recruiting and inter-Service budgeting issues. The potential risk herein is clearly that a Service’s doctrine becomes so disconnected from operational realities that it becomes rigid dogma, and therefore dangerously irrelevant to modern combat. The result is often costly in terms of lives and national treasure. Examples that come readily to mind include military shortsightedness with regard to the roles of the tank, the machine gun, the submarine, and the airplane.

Lacking a collective, inter-Service consensus, the imperative with regard to *current Joint Doctrine* has been that it be created with its own *distinct focus, standards, and guidance*. This has been achieved with varying degrees of success. Today’s *Joint Doctrine* represents an attempt to establish the necessary planning and execution commonality for the employment of national military power to achieve strategic ends. *Joint doctrine* is represented as “fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces,” and is declared **authoritative** guidance for the joint employment of our Armed Forces. An extensive joint publications system, with a subject matter hierarchy and comprehensive development process, has been initiated to produce the necessary guidance to “fundamentally shape the way we think about and train for war.”

The authors of *doctrine* are influenced by multiple factors. Dr. James J. Tritten identifies **enduring** factors (*strategic culture, geography, demographics, government, and lessons of experience and history*) and **topical** factors (*current policy, resources, strategy, campaign concepts, existing doctrine, threats and technologies*). Clearly, *doctrine* must evolve as influencing factors change. Modern history is replete with failed rulers and defeated nations whose doctrine failed either because of a fatal misinterpretation of current influencing factors or ignorance of the enduring operational concepts upon which sound doctrine is based.

## *Joint Application of Operational Art and Doctrine*

The forces of each Service train and fight synergistically with those of the other Services as elements of *joint* or *coalition* forces. In that context, our study of *Operational Art* continues with a review of the Services’ doctrinal perspectives on *Operational Art* and current *Joint Doctrine* interpretations, as represented in Joint Publication 3-0, the keystone document of the joint operations series. The publication’s *Fourteen Facets of Joint Operational Art* embody the doctrinal

guidance for Joint Force Commanders to plan and conduct joint and multinational operations and campaigns.

The *Facets* outlined in Joint Pub 3-0 include *Synergy, Simultaneity and Depth, Anticipation, Balance, Leverage, Timing and Tempo, Operational Reach and Approach, Forces and Functions, Arranging Operations, Centers of Gravity, Direct versus Indirect Attack, Decisive Points, Culmination, and Termination*. Be prepared to discuss the meaning of these *Facets*, and how they apply to a Joint Force Commander's (JFC) planning efforts.

The point of contact for this session is PROF Theodore L. Gatchel, C-413.

#### **D. Questions:**

What were the major factors which influenced *American Operational Art* as it developed? Are the Services' perspectives on *Operational Art* distinct? Are their roles unique? Is the joint perspective on *Operational Art* comprehensive? Should it be?

How does *Operational Art* relate to *Doctrine*?

What is *Doctrine*? What is its role? Under what circumstances should *Doctrine* be revised? Is Dr. Tritten's list of factors which influence *Doctrine* valid? Complete? What factors do you think do/should influence *Doctrine*? Does our current joint doctrinal developmental system produce useable *Doctrine*? Can it? Should *Joint Doctrine* be authoritative?

How does *Service Doctrine* relate to *Joint Doctrine*? Should it?

Are the *14 Facets of Joint Operational Art* sufficient for joint planning and force execution?

#### **E. Required Readings:**

Tritten, James J., "Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine"; *Naval War College Review*; Spring 1995. (NWC 1064).

Hughes, Jr., Wayne P., Capt, USN (Ret), "The Power in Doctrine"; *Naval War College Review*; Summer 1995. (NWC 1018).

Toffler, Alvin and Heidi, "AirLand Battle"; *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*; Chapter 7; pp. 44-56. (NWC 1019).

Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*; pp. III-9 to III-24.



## NATIONAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Seminar)

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*Where there is no vision, the people perish.*

Proverbs, XXIX, 18

*...Our National Security. This is the most basic commitment of America's government, and the greatest responsibility of an American President. Our nation's ideals inspire the world, but our nation's ships and planes and armies must defend these ideals and sustain our allies and friends.*

President George W. Bush, February 2001

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### A. Focus:

This session focuses on the organization and roles of the Department of Defense (DOD) and its components, and the methods and doctrine employed to achieve unity of effort, if not unity of command. To begin this seminar, we will analyze the role of DOD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—with particular emphasis on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Combatant Commanders, the Services, and the Reserve components. We will also examine the current plan for the organization of U.S. military forces throughout the world, and the authority that a commander can exercise over joint forces.

### B. Objectives:

- Understand the roles, relationships and functions of the CJCS, JCS, Unified Combatant Commanders, Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Service Chiefs.
- Comprehend how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. force structure affect the development of joint military strategy.
- Comprehend the Department of Defense systems and processes by which national ends, ways and means are reconciled, integrated and applied.
- Comprehend the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.

### C. Background:

The National Security Act of 1947 was the first legislative attempt to achieve unity of military effort in U.S. history. This Act provided for a Secretary of National Defense and established the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as a permanent agency. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 had extensive impact on DOD. Two of the principal aims of this legislation were to reduce the effects of Service parochialism on defense policy and to improve unity of effort by increasing the authority of the Unified Combatant Commanders. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) provides guidance to the Department of Defense to carry out the provisions of legislative action. Just as the National Security Act of 1947 has been amended several times, the UCP is reviewed on a routine basis in an effort to optimize the warfighting and support command structure.

Direction of U.S. military forces is currently accomplished through a single chain of command with two distinct branches. The operational (and strategic) direction of combatant forces is accomplished through the operational chain of command, which runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Unified Combatant Commanders, with communications running through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For matters not involving strategic and operational direction of combatant forces, guidance is issued through the administrative branch of the chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to Service secretaries and Service chiefs to commanders of Service forces. The preparation and provision of forces to the combatant commands are accomplished through this “administrative” branch of the chain of command, separate and distinct from the operational branch.

Various command relationships may exist among active duty and reserve component organizations involved in joint operations. How much authority a commander can exercise over a supporting or subordinate organization depends upon the specifically delineated command relationship that exists with that organization. A thorough understanding of command relationship alternatives is, therefore, essential in joint operations. Some important command relationship alternatives to be cognizant of are:

- Combatant Command (COCOM)
- Operational Control (OPCON)
- Tactical Control (TACON)
- Administrative Control (ADCON)

The point of contact for this session is Lt Col Joseph C. Dill, USAF, C-217.

#### **D. Questions:**

How is “civilian control” maintained? When did joint efforts begin? Was this the same period as when the JCS system was formalized?

As highlighted in the readings, the CJCS exercises control over no forces, nor can he deploy forces. Consequently, is the CJCS just a figurehead? If not, what kind of power and authority does he have and how does he get it? Is CJCS too powerful?

How has the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act impacted the National Military Organization? What are the pluses and minuses that have resulted from this statute? Does the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act need to be revised for the new millennium as our military force structure is updated ? If so, in what ways?

How might the creation of the new combatant command, United States Northern Command impact the other geographic Combatant Commanders?

In the 30 April 2002 UCP, what new roles were the Unified Combatant Commanders assigned?

United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as of 1 October 2002 will not be have a geographic AOR. How can USJFCOM be responsible for establishing and publishing Joint Doctrine without having an AOR to command? Does this pose a credibility problem of Joint Doctrine?

In almost any envisioned conflict, the geographic Combatant Commander with primary responsibility for employment of forces in his respective geographic theater, will require support from other combatant commanders. Does the “in support of” relationship between supporting and supported commanders provide sufficient authority to the supported Combatant Commander to ensure unity of effort?

To what extent does Service parochialism still exist? Cite examples.

How is the “Total Force” concept organized? Describe the organization of the Reserve Component. Should a reserve or guard commander sit on an equal basis with the other Joint Chiefs of Staff?

#### **E. Required Readings:**

*Unified Command Plan* (unclassified version) 30 April 2002 (**NWC 2021B**).

JFSC Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000*, pp. 1-2 to 1-47.

Fiscal Year 2000 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Programs*, May 2001, pp. 1-20 and 111-117.



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## OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS (Seminar)

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*I don't know what the hell this 'logistics' is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it.*

Fleet Admiral E. J. King to a staff officer, 1942

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### A. Focus:

This session provides an overview of logistics at the operational level of war. It addresses the principles of logistics, joint boards and cells, and the geographic combatant commander's logistics responsibilities. Finally, it examines operational logistics planning considerations.

### B. Objectives:

- Comprehend current joint logistics doctrine.
- Understand the Principles of Logistics.
- Understand logistics at the operational level.
- Identify and describe the joint boards and offices that directive authority for logistics allows a combatant commander to routinely use or establish.
- Identify the different classes of supply.
- Identify multinational logistics considerations.

### C. Background:

The operational commander, and members of the commander's staff, must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of operational logistics, if he or she is going to successfully execute daily peacetime operations and, certainly, operations across the full spectrum of conflict. Providing logistics to our forces throughout the world is a very complicated process and requires a great deal of coordination and synchronization by both supported and supporting commands and organizations. Even though logistics is normally a Service responsibility, the Combatant Commander retains Directive Authority for logistics and must decide if and when it is appropriate to exercise that authority.

This lesson includes an overview of the principles of logistics, the geographic Combatant Commander's responsibilities for supply, and directive authority for logistics. Also included in the session are logistics joint boards and offices, joint and coalition logistics considerations, and the classes of supply. Additionally, considerations for logistics planning and types of servicing are also key areas for the Combatant Commander to understand, and are discussed during this session.

Point of contact for this session is LTC G. P. Wilson, U.S. Army, C-415.

#### **D. Questions:**

How can operational logistics extend operational reach for the combatant commander?

What are the key elements of a logistics system that must be taken into account when developing a concept of logistics support?

Why should a combatant commander be concerned about exercising Directive Authority for Logistics, if logistics are an individual Service responsibility?

What logistics planning considerations should be taken into account when conducting joint operations?

In a multinational operation, what logistics issues should the combatant commander consider?

What is the difference between a “push” and “pull” logistics system?

#### **E. Required Readings:**

Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations*, 6 April 2000. Executive Summary (pp. v through ix); Chapter I, para 1, 2, and 3 (pp. I-1 through I-14); Chapter II; Chapter III; Chapter IV, para 1, 2, and 3 (pp. IV-1 through IV-6); Appendix B and Appendix C.

*Joint Vision 2020*, Focused Logistics, pp. 24-25.

#### **F. Supplementary Readings:**

Joint Pub 4-07, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common User Logistics During Joint Operations*. (JEL)

Joint Pub 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations*. (JEL)

Joint Pub 4-01.8, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration*. Chap II, “Command Relationships,” pp. II-1 to II-12; Chap III “Planning,” pp. III-1 to III-18; Chap VIII “Enablers,” pp. VIII-1 to VIII-10; Appendix B, “JRSOI Support Structure,” pp. B-1 to B-3. (JEL)

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## STRATEGIC MOBILITY (Seminar)

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*Victory is the beautiful, bright-colored flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.*

Winston Churchill, The River War, 1899

*USTRANSCOM. . . their motto should be “try fighting without us.”*

General Henry Shelton, CJCS

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### A. Focus:

This session emphasizes how the national strategic mobility system works. It addresses the organization and mission of U.S. Transportation Command and its component commands. Finally, it examines the United States’ ability to deploy in support of global contingencies.

### B. Objectives:

- Know the role of the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) in working with the regional combatant commanders on strategic mobility and sustainability.
- Comprehend the elements of the strategic mobility triad: airlift, sealift, and prepositioning support.
- Understand the complexities involved in planning for the deployment of joint forces at the operational level of war.

### C. Background:

The ability of the U.S. military to successfully carry out its assigned tasks per our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy depends greatly on its capability to deploy forces, equipment, and sustainment to a theater of operations within a given period of time. While logistics includes all those supporting activities required to sustain a deployed force, strategic mobility defines that part of the logistics process which transports people, equipment, supplies, and other commodities by land, sea, and air, to enable military force projection. In fact, the operational commander must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the strategic mobility process if he or she is going to successfully execute a major operation or campaign. Force selection, phasing of operations, and risk assessment are directly tied to the ability to project forces and support from the United States to the area of responsibility, area of operation, or theater of war.

USTRANSCOM oversees the strategic mobility process. USTRANSCOM’s charter is to maintain and operate a deployment system for orchestrating the transportation aspects of worldwide mobility planning, integrate deployment-related information management systems, and provide centralized wartime traffic management. Actual movement is executed by USTRANSCOM

component commands: Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC-Army), Military Sealift Command (MSC-Navy), and Air Mobility Command (AMC-Air Force). The Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration (MARAD) bridges MSC, U.S. flag commercial companies, and U.S. unions for sealift procurement and operations.

The Strategic Mobility triad consists of prepositioned material, sealift, and airlift. Each triad component has distinct advantages and disadvantages in terms of response time, expense, availability of carrying assets, and carrying capacity. Sealift and airlift have access to only limited U.S. Government-owned assets, and thus are highly reliant on commercial industry under a variety of programs, including the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Voluntary Intermodel Sealift Agreement (VISA).

Point of contact for this session is Lt Col J. E. Brence, USAF, C-410.

#### **D. Questions:**

What are the major advantages and disadvantages of each leg of the strategic mobility triad?

How does the Combatant Commander or the CJTF interface with USTRANSCOM? What is the supported/supporting commander relationship?

What are the critical shortages in sealift and airlift and their root causes?

What are the major planning considerations facing operational planners in deploying a force to the theater of operations?

#### **E. Required Readings:**

*"Forces/Capabilities Handbook,"* Read Strategic Lift Chapter. (NWC 3153H).

Joint Deployment Process Course (CD ROM) August 2002. Accomplish modules on Introduction to JDP and Phases I-IV (NWC 2018). Note: The References that this CD ROM draws upon are Joint Pub 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*. Washington, DC: 7 September 1999., Joint Pub 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System*. Washington DC: 17 June 1997., and the *Joint Task Force (JTF) Deployment and Redeployment Handbook*, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center. Suffolk, VA: 24 April 2000.

North African Vignette. 1 August 2003 (NWC 2001A).

#### **F. Supplementary Readings:**

Snyder, Thomas J., and Stella T. Smith, "The War in the Persian Gulf." *Air Force Journal of Logistics*, Summer 1998, pp. 16-28. (NWC 4010).

USTRANSCOM Handbook 24-2, *Understanding the Defense Transportation System*, 3rd Edition, Scott AFB, IL: 1 September 2000, pp. 1-17. (NWC 4006).

Joint Pub 4-01, *Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System*. Washington DC: 19 March 2003.

Joint Pub 3-17, *Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations*, 14 August 2002. Read Chapter VII.

## **SERVICE CAPABILITIES AND DOCTRINE (Seminar)**

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*While the likelihood of global war has diminished since the end of the Cold War, the United States continues to maintain vigilance in areas critical to national interests. Efforts of the Armed Forces of the United States include facing significant challenges with respect to supporting joint force operations across the range of military operations, maintaining training and readiness at the highest levels, coordinating and cooperating with other Services and nations, exploiting opportunities of the information revolution, and preparing for future operations. Commanders today must orchestrate combined arms operations across the dimensions of air, land, sea, space, and time. In the future, closer coordination and cooperation between the Services and with other nations will assume even greater importance than they have today. Future joint and multinational forces will require compatible and complementary systems and doctrine that complement those employed by other Services, multinational forces, and national agencies, including non-Department of Defense (DOD) government agencies.*

Joint Pub 3-33, *Joint Force Capabilities*. Washington DC: 13 October 1999

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### **A. Focus:**

This seminar session affords a basic understanding of each of the individual services of the U.S. Armed Forces and Special Operating Forces (SOF) in terms of role, functions, doctrine, operational organization, capabilities and limitations, and integration into joint operations.

### **B. Objectives:**

- Understand the historic basis for roles and functions assigned to each of the services and SOF.
- Understand the doctrine of each service and SOF in general, and the basic principles that govern the organization, equipping, training, and employment of their forces.
- Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of each of the services and SOF operating forces, and how these capabilities complement each other and allied/coalition forces in joint and combined campaigns and operations, respectively.
- Understand the role of the reserve forces of each service.

### **C. Background:**

Session material is addressed in seminar format. Each of the services and SOF all bring unique capabilities to the joint fighting arena, offering our national leadership several options for obtaining national strategic objectives. While any of the forces mentioned above can serve in either a supported or supporting role, it is the synergy of these capabilities that has led to the astounding successes of American Arms in the execution of both wartime missions and military operations other than war (MOOTW) in today's global environment. Only by understanding not only the unique capabilities of each of our Armed Services and

SOF, but the doctrine for their employment as well, can the joint warrior craft elegant solutions for our senior leadership.

Point of contact for this session is PROF P. C. Sweeney, C-424.

#### **D. Questions:**

What capabilities and options do U.S. naval forces bring to a joint force commander, and how can these be integrated into joint operations?

How relevant to the post-Cold War global security environment are the naval service functions strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and sealift?

The concepts of expeditionary and littoral warfare are central to the 1992 and 1994 Naval Service White Papers. What are the implications and operational challenges of these warfare concepts for the U.S. maritime force commander?

Are there any significant differences between Sea Control and Battlespace Dominance?

How are battle groups and forces organized to conduct offensive and defensive operations?

What is the Marine Corps warfighting doctrine for winning in the uncertain, chaotic and fluid environment expected on the battlefields of the future?

How do the Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts for the 21st Century fit into the network centric environment expected on future battlefields?

How are MAGTFs structured to perform missions across the range of military operations?

What are the Marine Corps' four fundamental operating concepts for the conduct of expeditionary operations?

Why are Marine Corps forces assigned to Joint Task Forces typically organized under two separate component commands—the Marine Corps component and the Navy component?

The Air Force lists aerospace superiority as a core competency that enables the successful conduct of all other operations. What are the risks of failing to achieve aerospace superiority?

How does the Joint Force Commander organize, command, and control his aerospace forces? What are some options for the command and control structure? What are the traditional duties of the JFACC?

How does an asymmetric strategy provide benefits to a joint force commander?

How does the Air Force support Military Operations Other Than War? Do Air Force core competencies address this area of warfare?

Why is it important to link the target selection process to the objectives and effects to be achieved?



Be prepared to discuss the following questions pertaining to Army forces and doctrine:

What are the differences in combat capability between light and heavy forces?

What is the utility of airborne forces? Air Assault?

What are the five basic tenets of Army operations and what significance do they have for the operational commander and staff officer?

What are the relationships among close, deep, and rear operations at the operational level?

How does the Army envision the use of air-power on the battlefield? How would it use its organic aircraft? What support does it require of the USAF?

Beyond air power, how else can the operational commander conduct deep operations envisioned in Army operations?

How would Army forces be used along the range of military operations? Are some forces “better” than others at different points? Why?

Is the Army becoming too heavy and cumbersome to execute its power projection mission? How does the Army’s Transformation Plan address the challenge?

Which of the USCG’s capabilities can be of value to a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander in a contingency/wartime environment?

How does a JTF commander request and receive USCG support, and what are the issues associated with integration into the JTF?

How do USCG and USN/DOD assets work together in Maritime Exclusion Zones and in counter-drug operations? When do USN/DOD assets participate in Maritime Law Enforcement operations? Under whose authority?

Why do the characteristics of SOF and their principal mission areas result in an operational capacity-based vice an operational capabilities-based force?

How should SOF be integrated into theater operations in peacetime? Contingencies? What unique command and control considerations apply?

How and why do SOF emphasize the indirect application of military power? Does this require SOF to be more sensitive than general purpose forces to cultural and political considerations?

Why, how, when, and under what conditions should SOF be employed as a force multiplier?

What unique roles can SOF perform in coalition warfare?



## E. Required Readings:

*Forces/Capabilities Handbook*, All chapters except the chapters on Strategic Lift and Joint and Combined Forces (**NWC 3153H**) [Scan].

*Service Capabilities and Employment Considerations*, CD-ROM, December 2002 (**NWC 2002**).

North African Vignette. 1 August 2003 (**NWC 2001A**).

## OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL (Seminar)

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*“As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it is synonymous with joint warfare.”*

Joint Pub 1

*“The teams and staffs through which the modern commander absorbs information and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism. Ideally, the whole should be practically a single mind.”*

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

*“The only thing worse than fighting an Alliance is fighting without one.”*

Winston Churchill

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### A. Focus:

This session addresses the employment of joint and combined forces. It examines and analyzes a Joint Force Commander's organizational options and considerations when standing up a joint force and then extends this to considerations, both tangible and intangible, that he may have to be mindful of when extending his command to the combined arena.

### B. Objectives:

- Understand the role of joint doctrine with respect to unified command.
- Examine joint operational art and, especially, its application via the joint task force.
- Understand how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with forces from other countries and with interagency and non-governmental organizations.
- From an operational commander's viewpoint, understand the practical differences between an alliance and coalition along with the associated advantages and disadvantages such relationships bring.

### C. Background:

Combatant commanders face the possibility of executing missions across the full range of military operations. They must plan for Major Theater Wars (MTWs) at the high end of the conflict spectrum as well as a variety of military operations at the opposite end of the spectrum. Whatever the scope or intensity of any particular action, the joint force commander must consider how a force is organized in order to achieve the following goals:

- Clarity of Objective
- Unity of Effort
- Centralized Direction
- Decentralized Execution

To address both the mission to be accomplished and the objective to be attained, a wise commander will account for operational functions when structuring a force. To bring the seminar discussion into focus within the framework of joint doctrine the required readings will include sections of Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Procedures for Forming & Operating a Joint Task Force*. This reading discusses the authorized command relationships and authority military commanders can use; provides doctrine, principles, and policy for the exercise of that authority; and provides doctrine, principles, and policy for organizing joint forces; and the prescribed policy for selected joint activities.

Once U.S. considerations are understood we can then go on to examine the often more thorny issues of alliance and coalition warfare.

A variety of key planning documents, including the U.S. National Security and National Military Strategies, highlight the U.S. preference for operating with alliance and coalition partners to achieve U.S. national objectives. In fact, key tenets of U.S. military strategy (e.g., forward presence and engagement) depend heavily upon other nations to realize success. Current basic joint doctrine for the conduct of multinational operations is contained in the readings from Joint Pubs 3-0 and 3-16. Today the U.S. is a member of five multinational alliances and three bilateral Alliances; her obligations to each can and do vary.

Multinational operations present a variety of unique operational considerations for the military commander, not least of which is the thorny issue of establishing unity of effort/command. It has become fashionable to take the “Unity of Effort/Parallel Command” architecture, as demonstrated by the DESERT STORM operation, as the norm and to assume that Unity of Command, in its purest sense, will be unattainable. Alliances, which offer more formal and enduring command relationships, provide a range of capabilities from which the commander may draw. Organizing an allied force, however, can still present significant headaches given potential diplomatic and political sensitivities (the issue of Macedonia during the Kosovo crises for example). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the best-known of the formal alliances in which the United States participates. NATO has adopted the CJTF concept, however, many argue that the CJTF may have too many “moving parts” for it to be a workable and sufficiently reactive option for a political entity such as NATO that is wedded to consensus. It may be significant to note that NATO’s latest military actions in the Balkans (Air strikes over Kosovo) were not conducted with a CJTF and, in fact, greatly resembled a “Lead Nation” operation.

Coalitions, which are normally formed in an ad hoc manner, often represent a disparate group of nation-states responding to a common specific threat at a particular time, thus posing even more demanding challenges to the commander than the more stable alliance. Designing a workable command relationship for coalition forces during Operation DESERT SHIELD was one example of such challenges. Maintaining the integrity of a coalition may become a critical factor/objective in the successful execution of a combined operation. Consequently,

any planning must cater to an astute adversary who, recognizing the strategic importance of coalition cohesion, seeks to exploit any perceived weaknesses.

As a practical matter, coalitions are most often composed of United Nations member states from a specific region or localized area. Legitimacy is claimed by invocation of the U.N. Charter, specifically Chapter 1, Article I: “The Purposes of the United Nations are: . . . To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. . . .”

Finally, much has been written about the advent of the information age causing a technology “gap” between the globally-focused U.S. and the more regionally-focused allied nations. Whether you are pessimistic or optimistic as to the outcome, there is little doubt that degrees of multi-national interoperability will remain a demanding pre-requisite for success at the Operational level of War.

The point of contact for this session is CDR Richard Buckland, RN, C-409.

#### **D. Questions:**

In addition to mission and objective, what other factors might influence the selection of an organizational structure?

Some might argue that the underlying rationale for a JTF is to ensure each Service will be represented. Is this true?

Is the premise for a JTF budgetary in nature or does the JTF reflect a flexible/ useful option?

What are some of the critical issues an operational commander must consider when planning and executing a combined operation?

Given the long term obligations of an alliance and the turbulent, changeable world we find ourselves in, has the alliance, as a method of binding force effort together, lost out to the seemingly more flexible coalition or are there enduring qualities that can provide operational military benefits?

What factors are relevant in establishing an effective C2 organization within a coalition? Should we still strive for true unity of command? Include consideration of the situation wherein the overall commander may not be a U.S. military officer.

How can we reconcile the United States’ steadfast pursuit of advanced (and expensive) technology with the strategic directive to embrace multinational operations as the expected norm and to seek interoperability with our allies? How does this translate down to the Operational Commander in the field? Will a dependence on superior technology be the final straw that breaks the allies’ backs?

How might the adoption of network centric warfare by U.S. forces affect our ability to conduct multinational operations? What distinct challenges does this present to the multinational operational commander?

How can a commander ensure that necessary intelligence, some of which may be the product of very sensitive sources, is disseminated and understood by coalition partners, some of whom may be future adversaries?

What can the commander do during peacetime, given a particular area of responsibility (AOR) and range of potential contingencies, to improve the effectiveness of coalition operations in a future crisis?

**E. Required Readings:**

*Forces/Capabilities Handbook*, Read chapter entitled Joint and Combined Forces (NWC 3153H).

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Washington DC: 10 Sep 2001. Read pp. VI-1 to VI-13.

Joint Pub 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, Washington DC: 5 April 2000. Read pp. vii-x and II-1 to II-15.

North African Vignette. 1 August 2003 (NWC 2001A).

**F. Supplementary Readings:**

JFSC PUB 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, pp. 1-45 through 1-53.

Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces.

## INTELLIGENCE/C4ISR (Lecture)

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### A. Focus:

This session focuses on what the Joint Force Commander (JFC) needs to know in order to maximize intelligence/C4ISR support for planning and executing major operations and campaigns. Joint Doctrine gives the JFC ultimate responsibility for intelligence. In order to exercise this responsibility effectively, the JFC needs to understand what is and is not feasible, have some idea of available C4ISR capabilities (and the constant competition for these limited resources), and enough understanding of the discipline to focus optimally the overall C4ISR effort.

### B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the critical importance of intelligence throughout the planning and execution of joint force operations.
- Comprehend how intelligence processes, products and organizations support the Joint Force Commanders (JFC).
- Understand how joint, national, and service systems are integrated at the operational level of war.

### C. Background:

An operational commander's principal focus is on achieving strategic and/or operational level objectives using his own and supporting forces. This focus has two key components. First, the commander must know the capabilities and limitations of his own forces. Second, he must know his adversary.

The JFC's ability to "know" his adversary will always have limits. While technology has made significant improvements in some areas, serious limitations remain in what the JFC can expect to know (and limitations will remain for the foreseeable future). The JFC needs to understand enough about key technical and human intelligence resources and systems to plan in a realistic fashion; if he "counts on" unobtainable information, the chances the operation will fail greatly increase. The JFC also needs to understand the value of fully integrating key intelligence personnel into both the operational planning and execution processes. Doing so allows these intelligence personnel to provide critical guidance as the plan develops and to tailor intelligence resource tasking to the JFC's maximum advantage. Finally, the JFC needs to understand how to maximize his chances of obtaining scarce national and theater intelligence assets which are essential to effective planning and execution.

The point of contact for this session is CDR Alan R. Wall, USN, Sims E-115.

### D. Questions:

Why is it important to integrate intelligence continuously into all aspects of operational planning and execution?

What national and theater intelligence resources are likely to be available to you as the Joint Force Commander?

How complete and continuous do you expect your information on the forward area of operations (and the threat in that area) to be? How close is it to your conception of acceptable “battlespace awareness?”

What are the most critical deficiencies in obtaining adequate battlespace information?

What are the most important factors in determining whether required information is available to you? What are the primary resource allocation issues?

#### **E. Required Readings:**

Maresh: “C4ISR and the Operational Commander” (**NWC 2025B**).

Joint Pub 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*. Washington DC: 9 March 2000. Read pages III-1 through III-4, III-9 through III-11, and all of Appendix A.



## JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) (Seminar)

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*During the fall of 1989, during DOD's regular planning process, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) recommended and the Secretary approved a shift in the principal U.S. focus in the Persian Gulf. . . . Accordingly, the Secretary directed DOD to sharpen its ability to counter such a regional conflict on the Arabian Peninsula. In turn, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed CINCCENT to develop war plans consistent with this shift in emphasis.*

DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress

*Turbulence is a constant: it is what happens when you have to balance the management requirements to plan an operation with the flexibility needed by those who will soon be carrying it out. While it may have certain flaws, the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is the baseline system for all U.S. deployments, including those supporting peace operations.*

Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned

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### A. Focus:

This session will introduce the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). It will begin with an overview of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the roles of the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, the Joint Staff, and the Service chiefs and their staffs in translating national policy objectives into definitive planning guidance for the combatant commanders and their service component commanders. Attention will also be directed toward the guidance contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), a CJCS instruction that initiates the deliberate planning cycle conducted by the combatant commanders. The session then introduces the deliberate planning process, and compares and contrasts it with the time-sensitive, crisis action planning process. Emphasis will be on an overview of the five phases of the deliberate planning process and the six phases of the crisis action process. We will also examine the tasking and coordination methodologies, and the relationships between the key elements/products of both processes. Specific among these key products will be a detailed look at the plans and orders that are generated as both facilitating directives and final planning tools.

### B. Objectives:

- Know the purpose, roles, functions, and responsibilities and relationships within the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). Each entity within JPEC has definitive input to the Deliberate Planning Process and the Crisis Action Planning process. Seminar members must understand these activities during a crisis or the execution of joint military operations.
- Comprehend the interrelationship of the JSCP in the Planning System with emphasis on the deliberate and crisis action planning process.

- Know the five phases of the deliberate planning process and the six phases of the crisis action planning process used within JOPES and the products and their functions derived from these processes.
- Comprehend how the national military direction for the combatant commander is developed and disseminated in the context of the Joint Strategic Planning System and how various components of the planning processes support military force deployment and employment.
- Understand how to prepare the plans and orders that are part of the JOPES process using the “Five paragraph format.”
- Know how to prepare an OPORDER using synchronization matrices as planning tools and be able to analyze military directives for proper form and good content.

### **C. Background:**

As mandated by Title 10 USC, the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS are pivotal in translating national security objectives into definitive planning guidance for the combatant commanders. The Service chiefs and their staffs are also involved in the process, both as contributors to the joint planning guidance and in deriving Service plans that provide the trained and equipped forces to support that process. The combatant commanders are responsible for the actual development and production of the operation plans, but are dependent on support from the Services, other combatant commanders, and the combat support agencies during the planning and execution process.

JOPES provides the overall framework for the Military Planning process, both the five-phase deliberate planning process (DPP) and the six-phase crisis action planning (CAP) process. The need for JOPES stemmed from the recognition, based on actual crisis situations, that previous systems focused primarily on deployment and did not adequately support employment activities. JOPES was therefore developed to give senior level decision makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and control events during both the planning and implementation of joint operations.

The JSCP is the method by which the CJCS initiates the deliberate planning cycle. It includes regional objectives and planning assumptions; it specifies the type of plan for each task; and it apportions major combat and strategic lift forces to the combatant commanders for their planning. The JSCP also provides the combatant commanders with a framework for the scope of their plans, their formats, and the amount of detailed planning that is required. Deliberate planning is a complex and lengthy process, particularly when the combatant commanders are required to develop Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD).

The six phases of CAP may have to be executed almost instantaneously, and plans may have to be altered substantially once forces are ashore in the crisis area or when strategic objectives change. In certain crises, the phases may be compressed, entirely eliminated, or conducted concurrently. Moreover, the process could terminate during any of the phases should the crisis subside before the execution

phase is reached. The 1983 Grenada operation, URGENT FURY, the 1989 Panama operation, JUST CAUSE, the 1990 Middle East crisis, DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, and the latest operations in Kosovo, ALLIED FORCE, stand as examples of such dynamic situations.

The current SecDef Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and the JSCP are both based on the assumption that there is utility in developing deliberate plans that may guide NCA response to crisis. If that assumption is to be true, we must understand how deliberate plans can be used to guide or expedite crisis action planning or execution, and which agencies are responsible for specific portions of the planning process.

The point of contact for this session is PROF P.C. Sweeney, C-424.

#### **D. Questions:**

What is the basis for the planning tasks assigned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan?

How are limited resources and forces matched to planning requirements necessary to support the national security strategy and objectives? Does the JSCP address combat forces only?

How is strategic lift considered during deliberate planning?

Does the combatant commander need a tasking from the CJCS to initiate deliberate planning?

How does the combatant commander provide guidance to the staff and component commanders?

What types of plans are developed during the Deliberate Planning process? During the CAP?

Are deliberate plans really only deployment plans? How does the combatant commander express how forces are to be employed?

Is CAP sufficiently flexible for “evolving” crises? What happens when major changes occur? How effective do you think CAP will be in meeting the challenges of the future?

Have recent U.S. military operations validated the hoped-for correlation between deliberate and crisis action planning? If so, what portions of the deliberate plan will normally need to be modified in times of crisis?

#### **E. Required Readings:**

“Instructional JSCP,” (NWC 2-03) Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2002. (SECRET/NOFORN) (Issued on class day).

Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine of Planning Joint Operations, Washington, D.C. : 13 April 1995. Read sections IB through IE (pp. I-4 throughout I-20); section IIA (pp. II-1 through II-7); and sections IIIA through IIID (pp. III-2 through III-17).

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## OPERATIONAL LAW AND FACTOR SPACE (Seminar)

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*The Department of Defense strongly supports U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. A universally respected ocean regime, with strong, unambiguous guarantees of fundamental operational rights, such as passage through foreign territorial seas, through international straits, and through the world's archipelagoes, preserves the ability of the U.S. to deter and respond to threats whenever and wherever required.*

—Secretary of Defense, 2001 Annual Report to the President and the Congress

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### A. Focus:

This seminar focuses on a basic understanding of operational law affecting the operational factor of space. The rights of all nations to complete control of their land and air boundaries, and the rights of all nations to navigation and over flight within international waters and airspace are essential considerations in planning military operations.

### B. Objectives:

- Understand the operational considerations resulting from the sovereign right of all nations to limit the entry and movement of foreign forces within their land territory and national airspace.
- Consider the impact of operational law and factor space issues at the strategic and operational levels of war.
- Understand the traditional international legal rights of belligerent nations and neutral nations and how these rights effect military operations during armed conflict.
- Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies consistent with the principles of operational law and factor space.
- Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with alliance and coalition forces consistent with often divergent views of operational law and factor space.
- Analyze how operational law and factor space considerations impact the planning process.

### C. Background:

Among the operational art tools used by the operational planner are the three key operational factors of time, force and space. Factor space is heavily influenced by widely accepted international law rules governing the establishment and meaning of land, sea and air boundaries (a key characteristic of factor space). These boundaries directly impact the freedom of movement of the operational commander. During the deterrent (or pre-hostilities) phase of a military operation, military forces must respect the sovereign rights of all nations within the boundaries of their land territory, national waters and national airspace. This

means that with a few limited exceptions, military forces may not operate within another nation's boundaries without its permission.

During the hostilities phase of an operation, our movement will be conducted without regard to the sovereign rights of the enemy belligerent nation. However, the traditional sovereign rights of neutral states will likely continue to be respected and hence limitations on the freedom of movement of our forces within the land, sea and air boundaries of neutral states must be factored into our operational planning. Where limited navigation and over flight rights within neutral air and sea space prove insufficient, operational planners must notify the State Department of the need to obtain access and transit agreements in order to facilitate a planned operation.

Freedom of navigation and over flight over and through *international* waters and airspace (as well as the limited right of navigation and over flight in *national* waters and airspace) are fundamental requirements in implementing U.S. military strategy. These freedoms allow support and reinforcement of forward-deployed forces, enable U.S. and coalition forces to operate worldwide, and ensure uninterrupted world commerce. This session will include a study of the freedoms of all nations to navigation and overflight, as well as the rights of coastal nations to exercise jurisdiction over some portions of the sea and airspace for certain purposes.

Customary international law, as reflected in the UN Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention, provides widely accepted rules for global navigation and over flight. These rules have as their basis internationally agreed upon air and sea boundaries defined in the LOS Convention, and depicted in **NWC 1049**. These boundaries, and the navigation and over flight rights associated with them, strongly impact the planning and conduct of military operations.

Since 1983, U.S. policy has recognized the non-deep seabed mining provisions of the LOS Convention to be customary international law. Since that time, it has been Presidential policy for U.S. forces to “exercise and assert [United States’] navigation and over flight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the Convention.” Moreover, Presidential policy has been that the U.S. would not “acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and over flight and other related high seas uses.”

In July 1994, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution containing an agreement to modify the LOS Convention's deep seabed mining provisions. The U.S. signed the agreement on 29 July 1994. As a result, the basic LOS Convention, along with this supplemental agreement, was submitted to the Senate in October 1994 for its advice and consent. The Senate has not ratified the Convention. The U.S. is still not a party to it. The U.S. Navy has published guidance on the LOS regimes in Part I of *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*,

NWP 1-14M. This handbook is a great resource for the operational commander and his/her staff.

The point of contact for this session is CDR B. Waltman, JAGC, USN, C-424.

#### **D. Questions:**

What sovereign rights does a nation have within its land territory and national airspace, and how does this effect the movement or operation of foreign military forces therein?

What are the distinctions among innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea-lane passage, and high seas freedoms of navigation?

What are the rights and responsibilities of maritime and coastal nations with respect to each of these concepts?

To what extent may military operations of a belligerent nation be conducted within the land territory, national airspace, and national waters of a neutral nation?

#### **E. Required Readings:**

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Chapters 1 and 2, plus pages 7-1 through 7-8.

U.S. Naval War College, "Legal Regimes of Oceans and Airspace Areas" (**NWC 1049**).

U.S. Naval War College, "Case Study for Operational Law, Operation UPHOLD PAPUA" (**NWC 1070**). (**Be prepared to discuss problems 1-7 and 23 and 24 in seminar.**)



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## LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (Seminar)

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*Those skilled in war cultivate the Tao (the way of humanity and justice) and preserve the laws and are therefore able to formulate victorious policies.*

—Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

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### A. Focus:

When planning and conducting military operations, commanders and their subordinates must comply with the international law that governs the conduct of hostilities. This session is devoted to discussing the law of armed conflict for land, air, and naval warfare.

### B. Objectives:

- Examine the origins of and the purposes served by the law of armed conflict, and comprehend the reasons that nations comply or attempt to comply with it.
- Know the basic principles of the law of armed conflict.
- Apply the concepts of the law of armed conflict to the operational level of war.
- Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies consistent with the principles of the law of armed conflict.
- Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with alliance and coalition forces consistent with often divergent views of the rules of engagement.
- Analyze how the rules of engagement considerations impact the planning process.

### C. Background:

The law of armed conflict (LOAC) was historically referred to as the law of war. It is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is based on international custom and practice and on international agreements or conventions.

There are three general principles of the law of armed conflict: military necessity, proportionality, and humanity. The principle of **military necessity** allows a belligerent to apply force to achieve legitimate military objectives, while the principle of **proportionality** means that the degree of force used must be no greater than what is necessary and proportionate to the prompt realization of those legitimate military objectives. The principle of **humanity** forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes. These principles require, for example, that belligerents distinguish as much as reasonably possible between combatants and noncombatants when targeting.

The law of armed conflict is also consistent with certain principles of war, such as objective, mass, and economy of force. Both the law of armed conflict and the principles of war stress the importance of directing force against critical military targets, while avoiding the waste of resources against objectives that are militarily unimportant.

Part II of the *Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations* presents an overview of the rights and duties of military personnel under the law of armed conflict. In DOD Directive 5100.77, the Secretary of Defense has directed that the U.S. Armed Forces comply with the law of armed conflict during all armed conflicts and to apply the principles and spirit of the law of armed conflict during all other military operations.

The point of contact for this session is CDR B. Waltman, JAGC, USN, C-424.

#### **D. Questions:**

Why is it in a nation's best interest to comply with the law of armed conflict? Why is it in the best interest of the military commander?

To what extent does the law of armed conflict apply to civil wars and to Military Operations Other Than War?

What are the major protections afforded by the law of armed conflict to the wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and civilians in occupied areas?

What are the principal international law considerations with respect to selection of targets and selection of weapons?

What are the requirements to be a lawful combatant or noncombatant? What is an illegal combatant? What legal rights do enemy combatants have in the U.S. view?

How has the law of armed conflict changed, if at all, since September 2001?

#### **E. Required Readings:**

Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Chapters 5 through 12.

U.S. Naval War College, "Case Study for Operational Law, Operation UPHOLD PAPUA" (NWC 1070). **(Be prepared to discuss problems 15-22 in seminar.)**

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## RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (Seminar)

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*The determination of hostile intent is the single most difficult decision that a commander has to make in peacetime.*

ADM Kelso

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### A. Focus:

This session concerns rules of engagement (ROE), which define for operational forces the circumstances and extent to which they may use force. The session highlights the U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE), and then reviews the foundation for and process involved in developing ROE and how they are employed in military missions (whether we are dealing with conventional warfare or military operations other than war).

### B. Objectives:

- Gain an understanding of ROE and the process by which modifications to ROE are obtained from higher authority.
- Understand the need for clear and comprehensive ROE, the principles underlying them, and their role in the civilian control of the military.
- Examine ROE development in the planning process.
- Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies consistent with the rules of engagement as authorized by civilian leaders of the U.S. military.
- Comprehend how to coordinate U.S. military plans and actions effectively with alliance and coalition forces consistent with often divergent views of the rules of engagement.
- Analyze how the rules of engagement considerations impact the planning process.

### C. Background:

ROE are the primary means by which the President/Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders guide U.S. military forces in the use of force. U.S. forces operate under the SROE contained in a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3121.01A). The SROE provide direction and guidance regarding the inherent right of **self-defense**, which applies at all times (from peace to war). The SROE also provide a list of supplemental measures from which appropriate ROE can be requested for a given operation to provide additional ROE for **mission** accomplishment.

Both the inherent right of self-defense and mission accomplishment ROE have as their legal basis the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Depending upon the circumstances surrounding a given operation, mission

accomplishment ROE may also be justified on a specific UN Security Council Resolution.

When mission accomplishment ROE are issued for armed conflict, the law of armed conflict applies and will shape the ROE selected. Although international law relating to the use of force is an important consideration in drafting ROE, political guidance and operational requirements are the most significant factors, which shape ROE.

All ROE should be consistent with national policy, military strategy, and the missions assigned by higher authority. ROE must be framed and interpreted in conjunction with the mission and should support, not inhibit, mission accomplishment.

In operational planning, the adequacy of ROE is assessed during the mission analysis in the Commander's Estimate of the Situation. In all subsequent phases of the military decision-making process, it is vitally important that commanders and their planning staffs continue to be alert to the effect that ROE have on mission accomplishment, and to seek changes to the ROE when appropriate. The J-3 is normally responsible to the Commander for ROE development, with the assistance of the other staff, including the staff judge advocate.

The point of contact for this session is CDR B. Waltman, JAGC, USN, C-424.

#### **D. Questions:**

What factors lead to the need for unit or individual self-defense?

What are the limits of actions that may be taken in self-defense?

To what extent is preemptive action consistent with the SROE?

How can a combatant commander ensure that subordinate commanders do not misinterpret the ROE or put an undesired "spin" on the approved ROE?

To what extent should the SROE continue to be used during armed conflict?

What measures have to be incorporated into the SROE to transition from MOOTW to war?

What additional ROE considerations are involved in coalition warfare? In UN operations?

What is the appropriate role of the legal advisor in developing and implementing ROE?

In the Terror War and in Homeland Security, are there new considerations regarding rules of engagement?

Are the rules of engagement and use of force rules the same for all military and civilian forces participating in Homeland Security?

## E. Required Readings:

Joint Pub 3-0, Chapter III, paragraph 6.n. (Page III-35)

Joint Pub 5-00.2, Chapter IV, paragraph 9. (Page IV-6 to IV-8)

Duncan, James C., "The Commander's Role in Developing the Rules of Engagement" (**NWC 1066**).

Rose, S., "Crafting the Rules of Engagement for Haiti" (**NWC 1051**).

U.S. Naval War College, Extracts from CJCS Instruction 3121.01A, "JCS Standing Rules of Engagement" (**NWC 1062**).[Scan].

U.S. Naval War College, "Blue's War Game Rules of Engagement" (**NWC 1139**). [Scan].

U.S. Naval War College, "Case Study for Operational Law, Operation UPHOLD PAPUA" (**NWC 1070**). (**Be prepared to discuss problems 8-14 in seminar.**)

## **MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW) (Seminar)**

### **A. Focus:**

This session deals with MOOTW. Seminar participants will discuss the material introduced, with special emphasis on the problems inherent in the conduct of MOOTW, the application of Joint Doctrine to MOOTW, and how Operational Art applies to MOOTW.

### **B. Objectives:**

- Comprehend the range of military operations.
- Understand the various types of operations short of war that the armed forces may be called upon to conduct in pursuit of national objectives.
- Comprehend the Principles of Military Operations Other than War and how they relate to the Principles of War.
- Review the elements of Operational Art as they apply to MOOTW.

### **C. Background:**

MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace, and as such, are traditionally more sensitive to changing political considerations than large-scale, sustained combat operations. MOOTW often have more restrictive rules of engagement to follow than all-out general war, and can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic). MOOTW are usually, but not always, conducted beyond the borders of the United States.

The point of contact for this session is PROF John D. Waghelstein, C-421.

### **D. Questions:**

Is there a better way to display the range of military operations than is shown in Fig I-1 of Joint Pub 3-07?

Provide some practical reasons for having two different sets of principles (i.e., Principles of War [MOOSEMUSS] and Principles of Military Operations Other Than War [SLURPO]).

Do the principles of MOOTW also apply to general, large-scale war?

To what extent is there a substantive difference in training for war and for MOOTW?

How do the factors of Time-Space-Forces apply to MOOTW?

How do traditional operational planning tools and methods apply to planning for MOOTW?

How do you know when you're done with a MOOTW mission? Then what?

Does establishing an effective anti-terrorism posture preclude such missions as humanitarian assistance?

**E. Required Readings:**

Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, 16 Jun 95.

White, Jeffrey B., "Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare." (NWC 3060).



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## HOMELAND SECURITY (Seminar)

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*On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars—but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war—but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.*

President George W. Bush

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### A. Focus:

This session examines the complex topic of homeland security and the military's role in protecting the American homeland. Seminar discussions should facilitate an understanding of the various responsibilities and issues involved in this rapidly evolving area. Students should draw on previous sessions covering national security direction; organizational and political influences, including Congress and various cabinet-level departments of the U.S. interagency; the relationships and functions of the President, SecDef, CJCS, and combatant commanders; as well as individual Service capabilities to discuss military options for responding to homeland security scenarios. The session should help the student appreciate the benefits of military and interagency cooperation, the tremendous complexity of defending the world's largest democracy—with its open borders, and the synergy possible with a unified response.

### B. Objectives:

- Understand U.S. national policy and general objectives with regard to homeland security.
- Comprehend the responsibilities of the DoD and the combatant commanders in protecting the United States, its possessions, and bases against attack, threat of attack, or hostile incursion.

### C. Background:

The attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that occurred on 11 September 2001 awakened many in the United States to the reality that their homeland was no longer as safe as they once had assumed it was. In the aftermath of these tragedies, the U.S. government began to reevaluate its homeland security posture, and while changes are still occurring, the complexity of responsibilities is overwhelming. On 8 October 2001, the President signed Executive Order 13228, which established the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council. Twenty-one days later, the first Homeland Security Presidential Directive was issued, defining the composition of the Homeland Security Council Principals Committee and the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee, while also establishing eleven Homeland Security Council Policy Coordination Committees. On that same date, President Bush appointed then-Pennsylvania Governor Tom

Ridge as the nation's first Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. On 6 June 2002, President Bush made a 13 minute speech proposing a change to the Executive Branch not seen since the National Security Act of 1947, with the creation of a new Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security.

While the Secretary of Defense's current Unified Command Plan (UCP) outlines general responsibilities for homeland defense, it also acknowledges that this is a very broad concept with numerous civil as well as military components and that specific DoD roles require greater definition. "Protecting the United States, its possessions, and bases against attack, threat of attack, or hostile incursion . . ." is a responsibility shared by all combatant commanders. However, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and part of the Atlantic Ocean are the geographic responsibility of the Commander, SOUTHCOM; defense of the north Atlantic Ocean, planning for land defense of CONUS, and military assistance to civil authorities (including consequence management) are responsibilities of the Commander, JFCOM; conducting computer network defense and providing warning of missile attack on CONUS, Hawaii, and Alaska are the responsibilities of the Commander, SPACECOM; and the Commander, PACOM's geographic responsibilities include most of the Pacific Ocean, Hawaii, and Alaska (excluding air defense of Alaska). Moreover, CONUS air defense is a responsibility of NORAD. While the potential seams between these responsibilities may seem a bit confusing, add to this mixture the maritime seams between the Navy and the Coast Guard, and the complexity of homeland defense begins to take on added dimensions. The creation of NORTHCOM will hopefully address many of these issues, but at this time the organization, missions, and C2 structure is under development, to be resolved prior to the 1 October 2002 stand up of the new command.

The Homeland Defense Case Study (**NWC 4025**) will challenge students to consider some of the maritime security planning issues facing planners in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September attacks. Studying this case should help illustrate the complexity of the homeland security challenge as students develop a list of critical considerations and suggest possible options for further examination.

The point of contact for this session is PROF John R. Ballard, C-411.

#### **D. Questions:**

What other agencies have responsibilities for homeland security and who is/should be in charge overall? How will coordination occur? What are the command and control arrangements?

To what extent are there overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities, and how will these be deconflicted?

How can we ensure that homeland defense is cohesive and that seams won't be exploited by potential enemies?

How will the creation of NORTHCOM and the revisions to the UCP address homeland security responsibilities? Is it sufficient?

What is the difference between Homeland Security and Homeland Defense?

**E. Required Readings:**

*Unified Command Plan*, Read page 3, para. 11.a., page. 7, para 16, pages 10-16, and Enclosure (1). 30 April 2002 (**NWC 2021B**).

U.S. President, “The Department of Homeland Security,” June 2002, pp. 1-9 (**NWC 3000**).

Naval War College, “Homeland Security Case Study,” December 2001 (**NWC 4025**).

NWP 3-10 (Rev. A), Chapter 1, “Naval Coastal Warfare Overview,” pp. 1-1 through 1-9. (**NWC 4026**).

U.S. President, “Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council,” Executive Order 13228, October 8, 2001 (**NWC 4023**).

U.S. President, “Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council,” Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1, October 29, 2001 (**NWC 4024**).

## **PEACE OPERATIONS (Seminar)**

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### **A. Focus:**

This session continues the examination of MOOTW. It uses a historical example to illustrate the use of military force and emerging doctrine (to include conflict termination) in Peace Operations. The seminar will conduct a critical analysis of U.S. Peace Operations in Somalia and discuss the operational lessons learned.

### **B. Objectives:**

- Comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategy.
- Understand the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed in peace operations.
- Comprehend the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the President and SecDef, NSC, CJCS, Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs, and JFCs in planning and executing peace operations.
- Comprehend the different types of peace operations and understand what can cause operations to shift from one type to another
- Analyze how theory and the principles of war apply to peace operations at the operational level of war.
- Know how national intelligence organizations support JFCs in peace operations.

### **C. Background:**

U.S. military involvement in Peace Operations has increased dramatically in the past decade and current world events point to continued involvement in the foreseeable future. Peace operations present a new challenge to those who spent years training to fight conventional wars. Peace Operations may take place in environments far less defined than combat, where combat power may be less important than non-combat power. The political and cultural dimensions may become central to the conflict and force may be needed to compel, not destroy. As discussed in the first session of this block, there are even distinct principles, the Principles of MOOTW (SLURPO), that supplement the Principles of War and guide our training and mission execution.

Additionally, the terminology of Peace Operations can be confusing. The subtle differences that characterize almost every mission have created a broad range of definitions. Joint Doctrine defines the terms associated with Peace Operations. Planners, commanders and forces must be comfortable with these definitions and be able to analyze, discuss and conduct Peace Operations in concert with other military leaders, interagency officials, the media, non-governmental, and private voluntary organizations.

This case provides the student with a wide variety of political, economic, cultural, legal and military challenges that faced both the United States and the United Nations in Somalia. The student should be prepared to discuss the major lessons learned from this case, analyze its possible impact on future Peace Operations, and recommend viable courses of action.

The point of contact for this session is PROF John R. Ballard, C-411.

**D. Questions:**

What are the distinctive characteristics of the following terms: Peace Operations, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Aggravated Peacekeeping, and Peace Enforcement?

Which governmental agency has the lead in each specific type of Peace Operation?

What is the role of the military commander in conflict termination planning for Peace Operations?

How effectively were the principles of MOOTW applied in Somalia?

What are some lessons from Somalia that we can/should apply in future peace operations?

**E. Required Readings:**

Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*.

Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, 16 Jun 95.

## THE COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (CES) (Seminar)

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*The one who is to draw up a plan of operations must possess a minute knowledge of the power of his adversary and of the help the latter may expect from his allies. He must compare the forces of the enemy with his own numbers and those of his allies so that he can judge which kind of war he is able to lead or to undertake.*

Frederick the Great: Letter 1748

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### A. Focus:

These sessions will introduce you to one of the most critical aspects of the planning process and the framework and steps involved in making a decision by selecting a Course of Action (COA). We will focus on the Navy's Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) as a model for military decision making. The CES Workbook will be used as an instructional tool and a guide as we apply these concepts to a scenario based on warfare in a littoral region. The seminar will use the exercise situation in Borneo to develop a CES, and then deliver a COA decision brief. Following this, the seminar will use the selected COA to develop and write an OPORD, which the moderators will critique and discuss with the group. While this exercise will highlight activities at all three levels of war, it will focus on the planning aspects and is not intended to progress into the execution phase. Additionally, we will review several other planning frameworks to provide insight and exposure to other systems in the art of decision making.

### B. Objectives:

- Apply the joint planning processes and joint operational art.
- Develop an ability to plan for and coordinate the employment of joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- Comprehend how joint unified and multinational campaigns and operations support national objectives.
- Summarize the roles, relationships, and functions of the President / SECDEF, CJCS, JCS, and Combatant Commanders in the National Military organization.
- Synthesize joint operational art at the joint task force level.
- Formulate, apply, and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.
- Comprehend and summarize the coordination considerations of U.S. plans and actions effectively integrating and employing Service, joint, and multinational forces, as well as interagency and nongovernmental organizations at the operational level of war.
- Comprehend the value of integrating IO into theater strategies and operational planning.



- Understand how the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System is integrated into operational IO campaign planning and execution to support theater and national strategic sustainment and warfighting efforts.
- Comprehend and apply technological changes in the 21st century battlespace.
- Apply Operational Law in operational planning.

### **C. Background:**

The course began by introducing the capabilities and doctrine of the various Services and several key operational issues critical to the planning process. The Commanders Estimate of the Situation applies and synthesizes these, and the theory of Operational Art, for making a sound military decision.

For most of the Twentieth Century, and during all of its major wars, the United States military used the CES to think through real and potential military situations and the myriad of influencing factors in order to arrive at decisions. In 1909, the U.S. Army adopted the Estimate of the Situation from the German General Staff; the U.S. Navy followed a year later.

As you will find out, there is a wide range of CES experience in your seminar, ranging from none to sophisticated use on joint staffs. There are also differences in Service perspectives in the planning framework as well as ideas from outside the military. The main purpose of the CES, and any planning framework, is to provide a logical sequence of actions in analyzing a military problem and reaching a decision.

Military commanders must continually make decisions, often under unfavorable conditions. The opponent's independent will and actions can considerably affect the execution of one's own plans and actions. Moreover, the physical environment, climate, and weather can significantly interfere with the commander's accomplishment of the assigned mission. The CES is designed to ensure that no matter of importance is omitted by the commander.

These sessions focus on describing the CES planning process utilizing the workbook and readings, and then synthesizing the knowledge through the Borneo (PACIFIC TEAK) Crisis Planning Exercise. This exercise focuses on the planning aspects of how to use forces during a crisis that develops in a littoral region. The seminar will act as members of a Joint Task Force (JTF). The concept of a Joint Planning Group (JPG) will be introduced to facilitate the Crisis Action Planning (CAP) process. The group will develop a CES based on the intelligence assessment and information provided in the readings.

An operational planner will be more effective if he or she has a good understanding of the different capabilities, limitations, and doctrines that each Service brings to the joint force. This effectiveness will be increased if the planner has a comprehensive understanding of the critical factors that affect the use of these forces at the operational and tactical levels. The seminar will discuss operational law issues relevant to the situation. The seminar will also have an opportunity to



discuss other planning frameworks. By now you should recognize Operational Art and the Five Questions as a foundation to military success.

The first step in the CES is the **mission analysis (MA) and joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB)**. The JIPB will be used to define the battlespace's environment; describe the battlespaces's effects in terms of time, space and forces; evaluate the threat; and determine threat COAs. The MA is the single most important element of the CES. It results in a proposed restated mission statement and the commander's issuance of his planning guidance. The mission should be constantly reviewed throughout the entire estimate process. The mission is contained in paragraph 1 of the CES and comprises paragraph 2 of the basic plan or OPORD.

The second step is to **develop friendly COAs** with respect to the enemy COAs developed in Step 1. These COAs will be developed through an analysis of relative combat power, the task organization of forces, and the development of a scheme of operation. A prepared statement and sketch will be used to analyze and compare the COAs. The scheme of the operation becomes the concept of the operation (CONOPS) and comprises paragraph 3 of the basic plan or OPORD.

The third step is to **analyze the courses of action**. The staff will select a war game method and technique to record and display the results. The staff will list all available forces, assumptions, known critical events and decision points, and significant factors and then war game the COA to assess the results.

The fourth step is to **compare the courses of action** with each other to help form the basis for the decision. The staff will consider advantages and disadvantages, identify actions to overcome disadvantages, make final tests for feasibility and acceptability, weigh relative merits of the COAs, and select one COA that offers the greatest chance of accomplishing the mission. To facilitate comparison between the retained COAs, the staff considers each COA in terms of the governing factors selected by the commander in his guidance.

The fifth and final step is the **decision**. The decision is based on both an objective review of the results of the tabulations and calculations of the outcome of each step in the process, as well as upon subjective analysis. The commander must rely heavily on his professional judgment in making a sound decision.

Based on the commander's decision and final guidance, the CES process is completed, and the staff now refines the COA and completes the plan and prepares to issue the order. The staff turns the selected COA into a clear, concise concept of operations and often completes a **joint synchronization matrix**. The Joint Synchronization Matrix is a staff decision and planning aid that graphically reflects the joint execution of an operation over a specific time period.

The point of contact for this session is COL Richard Findlay, USMC, C-415.

#### D. Questions:

What are some influences on the superior's mission that you will have to judge?

What tasks must be performed to accomplish a CES and what organizations are involved?

What are the shortcuts and pitfalls in planning and decision making?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the various planning frameworks?

What are the considerations for command and control of the assigned forces? Where will the CJTF be located? How will the JTF be organized? Will Network Centric Operations influence or impact JTF command and control? If so, how?

What are the enemy capabilities and courses of action that the Combatant Commander might confront?

What are the potential courses of action that the Combatant Commander can select?

Is the recommended course of action adequate (accomplishes the mission), feasible (accomplishes the mission with the assets available), and acceptable (accomplishes the mission with the estimated cost)?

Does the OPORD provide sufficient details for the forces to accomplish their mission?

Are actions of all participants synchronized towards this end? Will the proposed military condition lead to achievement of the political objective?

#### **E. Required Readings:**

Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*. Washington DC: 13 January 1999, pp. IX-6 – IX-14, VII-4 – VII-8, and VIII-15 – VIII-16. Review.

U.S. Naval War College, *Commander's Estimate of the Situation: Worksheet for In-Class Work and War Gaming*, 2002. (**NWC 4111F**). Note: Your moderator will provide you specific reading assignments.

U.S. Naval War College, *A Borneo Case Study for Expeditionary Warfare*, August 2002. (**NWC 2095B**).

U.S. Naval War College, *Plans and Orders*, January 2002. (**NWC 2159A**).

#### **F. Supplementary Readings:**

*Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. (**NWC 3153H**).

CJSCM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, VOL I (Planning Policies and Procedures)*, 14 July 2000.

CJSCM 3122.03A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, VOL II (Planning Formats and Guidance)*, CH-1, 6 September 2000.

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**JOINT TASK FORCE WAR GAME (JTFWG) (Seminar)**

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**A. Focus:**

The JTFWG provides an opportunity for the students to execute a seminar-derived plan in a simulated staff environment using the Military Planning Process and the Crisis Action Procedures. Students should be able to apply principles and concepts learned in previous sessions to a realistic scenario.

**B. Objectives:**

- To execute a concept of operations using joint and multinational forces to accomplish mission objectives in a crisis situation.
- To exercise operational-level decision-making at the Joint Task Force (JTF) staff level within the constraints of Peacetime Rules of Engagement (ROE), recognized laws of war, domestic and international law, and other policy considerations that may affect the political and military acceptability of a selected Course of Action (COA).
- To produce a concise and well developed Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) in a role playing environment that is cognizant of own and enemy capabilities and weaknesses, operational factors and functions, and takes into account termination goals and the desired end state.
- To comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces and how they can be most effectively employed to maximize the potential for the plan's success.
- To demonstrate an ability to plan for the use of other government and non-government agencies and organizations, recognizing their potential effects/contributions to the operation.

**C. Guidance:**

During the JTFWG, students will play the roles of key members of a JTF's planning staff, as well as the immediate, subordinate component commanders. During the actual running of the game, situational changes will most likely occur that will require modification to original planning.

A Seminar Memo will be distributed which contains the administrative requirements for running the JTFWG. This memo will include details on the schedule of events, locations, game mechanics and other information necessary for the conduct of the game.

The point of contact for this session is CAPT Jody Richardson, USN, C-413.

**D. Required Readings:**

U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations, "A Borneo Case Study for Expeditionary Warfare," Newport, RI: (NWC 2095A).

U.S. Naval War College, “Blue’s War Game Rules of Engagement.” Newport, RI: (NWC 1139).

#### E. Supplementary Readings:

The JTFWG involves application of material covered throughout the course. Therefore, students will have to make individual decisions regarding supplemental needs based upon their assigned roles, individual knowledge and professional expertise, and game play. The following listed materials may be of assistance to the students:

Joint Forces Staff College. *The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide*, 2000. JFSC Pub 1. Chapters 4,5, Appendices C, D, and E.

Joint Pub 3-0. *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. 10 September 2001.

Joint Pub 3-08. *Interagency Cooperation During Joint Operations*, Vol I, 9 October 1996.

Joint Pub 4-0. *Doctrine for Logistic Support for Joint Operations*. 6 April 2000.

Joint Pub. 500.2. *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*. 13 January 1999.

DeGeus, Stan. *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*, (NWC 3153H).

U.S. Naval War College, *Commander’s Estimate of the Situation Instructional Worksheet*. Newport, RI. (NWC 4111F)

Naval Warfare Publication 5-01 (Rev A). “*Naval Operational Planning*.” May 1998

U.S. Naval War College. “Extracts from *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, ‘Flexible Deterrent Options.’ ” (NWC 3081).